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Abstract 
 
The aim of the present work is to investigate the development of counterfactual 
emotions in children aged 3 to 10. More specifically, this work deals with the 
development of the emotions of regret and relief. Five studies were conducted to 
determine at which age children start to understand, to feel and to attribute to 
others counterfactual emotions, as well as to experience the comparison with 
others during a choice. Study 1 aims to replicate Weisberg and Beck’s paradigm, 
developed in 2010; and its results point out that children are able to feel regret at 5 
years of age and relief at 7. Study 2 introduces some methodological changes and 
shows that children are able to report regret and relief starting at 6. The 
importance of the responsibility for the choice in the experience of regret is 
supported by the results concerning the manipulation of sense of agency (Study 
3), with an effect on the experience of counterfactual emotions starting at 6 years 
old. To investigate the relationship between the ability to attribute to others 
emotions and to feel an emotion, study 4 aims to test whether children attribute to 
others regret and relief before experiencing them. The last study (Study 5: 
participants aged 3-11) concerns the development of social comparison and the 
experience of envy or gloating compared with the experience of regret and relief. 
The results  reveal an effect of social comparison that precedes the effects of the 
two counterfactual emotions. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
1.GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
 
We term “counterfactual” those emotions that are closely linked to 
counterfactual thinking. These are complex emotions, i.e. emotions that, unlike 
“basic” emotions (like fear or anger), are highly sensitive to cognitive and cultural 
influences (e.g., guilt, envy, shame, jealousy, loyalty, etc.).  
More precisely, counterfactual emotions are those emotions one usually 
feels when realizing that the outcome of a choice would have been different if an 
alternative decision was taken. Every day we happen to come into contact with 
counterfactual thinking in many of its forms: for example, if we lose a train, if we 
are late for an appointment or when we simply do what we after realize to be «a 
wrong choice». What is common to all these situations is the negative emotion 
that goes with it, or the positive emotion that we feel when we avoid a negative 
outcome. Counterfactual thinking underlies all these cases, as it is to think of 
imaginary alternatives. Specifically, if we feel regret, we contemplate alternative 
circumstances that are evaluatively better than actuality (=upwards counterfactual 
thinking); whereas if the simulated alternatives are evaluatively worse than 
actuality, the emotion will be the relief (=downwards counterfactual thinking) 
(Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman & McMullen, 1993). 
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For a long time decision theorists had been primarily focused and 
interested in the creation of normative models of choice, or the development of 
principles that allow to make rational decisions, such as the maximization of the 
expected utility (e.g. Edwards et al., 1984). In more recent times, with the 
emergence of descriptive models of choice aimed to identify the psychological 
mechanisms responsible for decision-making processes, rather than to provide the 
principles for the behavior of an ideal decision maker, the study of emotions 
related to decision-making processes had an increased importance as the necessity 
to create models in order to accurately predict actual choices made by “real” 
people. In my work I followed the latter (positive) approach on the study of 
decision making. 
 
1.1 The counterfactual emotion of «Regret» 
 
 There’s not still today a universally accepted definition of regret: 
researchers have proposed different definitions and sometimes they disagree 
within the same field of studies. The lack of a formal definition makes inevitably 
difficult interpreting and comparing results of different researches. As I 
mentioned before, feeling regret implies realizing the importance of making a 
different choice, instead of the one made, and it is a negative emotion that results 
from the comparison between what happened and what could have happened.  
For some economists (e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982), the 
knowledge of alternative outcomes is critical for the onset of regret, which is 
defined as the difference in value between the results obtained and the best of the 
alternative outcomes: the greater is this difference, the greater is the regret. 
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By contrast, research in psychology has suggested that the knowledge of a 
better outcome is not necessary; rather it is sufficient to imagine a better result. 
This type of comparison between the reality and alternative possibilities that could 
have been realized is a cognitive process that is commonly defined as 
counterfactual thinking.  
Since the past cannot be changed, the main question is why we feel such a 
painful emotion. One suggestion is that regret may have a functional role for 
adaptive behavior.  
Thus, for example, Roese (1997) suggests that upward counterfactuals 
could have an adaptive function: producing useful causal inferences they would 
have an effect on the agent’s intentions to perform success-facilitating behaviors 
in the future. If a similar situation occurs again, the person will be ready to deal 
with it in a more suitable way.  
In this perspective, the experience of regret, even if painful, is viewed as a 
functional and adaptive capacity, which can help us to learn from our mistakes in 
order to avoid committing them in the future (Zeelenberg, 1999a).  
These suggestions were generalized into a functional perspective on 
counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008). This perspective ascribes a 
beneficial role to counterfactual thoughts (construed as top-down rather than 
bottom-up processes) in order to regulate behavior. This marks a departure from 
Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) “norm theory” (the earliest theoretical tradition to 
explain counterfactual thinking) that sees counterfactual thoughts as a source of 
biases. 
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Another important function of counterfactual thinking seems to be the 
regulation of affect (cf. e.g. Roese & Olson, 1997; Johnson & Sherman, 1990). 
For example, generating downward counterfactuals seems to have a strategic 
function for mood regulation, so people can feel better after the generation of 
downward counterfactuals. Moreover, some experimental evidences have shown 
that people are able to recognize the benefits of regret, and this is evaluated more 
favourably than other negative emotions (e.g. Saffrey, Summerville and Roese, 
2008). 
The possibility to experience regret depends on the construction of 
counterfactual thoughts; and the intensity of the experience of regret is in relation 
to the availability of various counterfactual alternatives. Many researches showed 
a tendency to stronger emotional reaction for events for which is easier to imagine 
an alternative outcome. This phenomenon is known as emotional amplification 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  
Among the factors leading to the onset of regret it is important to mention 
the closeness of the alternative outcome, the action-non action factor, and the 
perception of responsibility (Arkes et al., 2002; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Feeney 
& Handley, 2006; Frijda et al., 1989; Landman,1987; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997; 
Zeelenberg et al., 2002).  
Another important parameter linked to regret is the proximity in time of 
the events. People are much more willing to change causes that are proximal in 
time to the event than causes distal in time; and they are also more willing to 
change things under their control than thinks which they can’t control (Girotto et 
al. 1991; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
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Note that regret is an emotion shaped by specific counterfactual thoughts, 
different from those who shape another emotion known as “disappointment”. As 
we are going to see in the next section, we can say that «regret is shaped by the 
generation of behavior-focused counterfactuals, whereas disappointment is shaped 
by the generation of situation-focused counterfactuals» (Zeelenberg et al. 1998).  
 
1.2 Regret and disappointment 
 
Regret and disappointment are both negative emotions but -- as we have just said -
- they can be distinguished from the nature of counterfactuals from which they 
derive. The emotion of Regret emerges as a result of counterfactuals in which we 
imagine to change our actions. The emotion of Disappointment arises when we 
imagine to change the events of the world, and hence when a negative outcome 
doesn’t depend on our choice but it depends on chance.   
Some researchers have argued that the two emotions can be differentiated 
on the basis of appraisals (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989) and phenomenologies (e.g. 
Roseman et al., 1994).  
According to the theorists of appraisal any emotion is related to a specific 
pattern of evaluation of events (Lazarus). Zeelenberg et al. (1998) asked 
participants to describe situations in which they felt regret or disappointment, and 
then they assessed their appraisals. They used eight appraisal dimensions 
(unexpectedness, motivational state, situational state, probability, control 
potential, legitimacy, problem source, and agency). Agency was composed by 
self-agency, other-person-agency and circumstances agency measures. Their 
study showed higher evaluations for disappointment in unexpectedness, wanting 
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something pleasurable, thinking that one was morally right, and causation by 
circumstances beyond anyone’s control measures. For Regret they obtained 
higher evaluations for thinking that one could do something about the event, and 
self-causation measures. 
As regards the phenomenological experience of the two emotions the 
researchers asked participants to evoke moments in which they felt an intense 
regret or disappointment and then to report feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, 
actions and motivations. Consistently with Roseman et al. (1994), their results 
showed significant differences between regret and disappointment for each 
dimension.  
All these studies suggest that regret and disappointment need to be 
differentiated. Regret implies thinking about own mistakes, the desire to go back 
and undo our action or decision. Disappointment implies a sense of inaction and a 
lack of power to change reality.  
A different perception of responsibility and agency also differentiates 
regret from disappointment. So, perceiving self as an agent and highly responsible 
are closely related to regret, while perceiving others as agents and not responsible 
are closely linked to disappointment (cf. e.g. Frijda et al. 1989).  
 
1.3 The Neural Basis of Regret 
 
Neuroscience studies have investigated which are the brain structures involved in 
decision-making and emotions associated with them. Several experimental 
evidences pointed at the orbitofrontal cortex as a crucial structure for decision-
making. The orbitofrontal cortex is activated in the evaluation and comparison of 
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outcomes and is connected with the dorsolateral prefrontal regions, active in 
reasoning and planning, and with limbic areas crucial for emotions, such as 
amygdala. Patients with focal lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, while 
keeping intact memory and reasoning, show reduced ability to make decisions, for 
example perseverating in losing financial investments, and in the social domain, 
being unable to maintain stable social relationships (Bechara et al., 2000). 
Damasio and colleagues attribute this deficit to the inability to generate somatic 
markers, or visceral sensations that “mark” positively or negatively the 
alternatives of a choice, that allow to anticipate the emotional consequences 
(Bechara et al., 1997). This hypothesis has been explored by the IOWA gambling 
task. In this game participants are presented with four decks of cards (two decks 
are “good” and two “bad”). Each deck contains cards that represent a win or a 
loss. In the “good” bunches winnings are low but it’s the same for losses. In the 
“bad” bunches winnings are high but losses are higher than winnings. Participants 
are given an initial amount of money and they receive instruction in order to play 
maximizing the winnings. After a few hands, healthy subjects show the ability to 
make the choice that involves less risky and more winnings in the long term: they 
tend to draw cards from the “good” deck. In contrast, subjects with lesion to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, do not show this pattern, continuing to choose 
indifferently from both decks. Their neurological deficit affect the ability to learn 
from past mistakes and affects their behavior in the game. For this reason, patients 
with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions, although equipped with standard 
cognitive and intellectual abilities, have a great difficulty in making decisions in 
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real-life situations. The somatic marker hypothesis showed a bottom-up influence 
on decision-making processes.  
Coricelli et al. (2005) claimed that, thanks to counterfactual reasoning, 
orbitofrontal cortex shows a top-down modulation of emotions. This happens after 
a particular decision followed by feedbacks about the obtained results. After the 
outcome of a particular choice, the comparison between the obtained result and 
the result of potential alternatives is made and this cognitive process 
(counterfactual comparison) represents a top-down modulation. According to the 
authors, the orbitofrontal cortex is supposed to be the brain area involved in the 
integration of cognitive and emotional components of the decision making 
processes. So, orbitofrontal cortex appears to have a fundamental role for regret 
and brain damages in that area determine an impairment in the feeling of 
counterfactual emotions such as regret (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 
2005). 
Camille et al. (2004) asked participants to make choices between two 
lotteries with different potential winnings. There were two conditions, “partial 
feedback” and “complete feedback” conditions. In the “partial feedback” 
condition participants received only information on the chosen lottery (see fig. 
1.1) and in the “complete feedback” condition they were presented with results of 
both lotteries (see fig. 1.2). At the end of the game, for each task, subject were 
asked to evaluate their emotional state. Healthy subjects reported emotional 
evaluations consistent with a counterfactual comparisons between the obtained 
and the unobtained outcomes (see fig. 1.3).  
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For example a payout of 50 € when the alternative choice would have been 
200 €, generated an extremely negative emotional response. On the other hand, a 
win of 50 euros when the alternative would have been a loss of 200 euros 
generated a counterfactual emotion of relief, a positive response to the outcome. 
So, the experience of regret generates choices characterized by an attempt to avoid 
other future regrets. Patients with selective lesions to orbitofrontal cortex don’t 
report regret and they don’t anticipate the negative consequences of their actions. 
Orbitofrontal patients (and not subject with other brain lesions) persist in the 
choices which healthy subject avoid after regret, because they are not able to 
anticipate and avoid a future negative counterfactual emotion. 
 
                       
   Fig.1.1 partial feedback condition                 Fig.1.2 complete feedback condition  
       (from Camille et al. 2004)                                                  (from Camille et al. 2004) 
 
 
                   Fig. 1.3 emotional evaluation 
                     (from Camille et al. 2004) 
 
Coricelli et al. (2005) reported an increase of brain activity in the 
orbitofrontal cortex during the experience of regret and during the anticipation of 
this emotion at the time of choice in a fMRI study with healthy participants. 
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Another important result concerns a greater involvement of cognitive components 
in future choices. Indeed, in the choices that follow an obtaining negative result, 
they observed an increase in brain activity for the inferior parietal lobe, the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right lateral orbitofrontal cortex. The negative 
emotional experience induces the intervention of areas involved in cognitive 
control and then the comparison between the obtained outcome and what we 
could have obtained with another choice.  
 
1.4.      The role of Orbitofrontal Cortex in decision making  
 
The Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a portion of the prefrontal cortex involved in 
decision making processes. Some portions of the OFC are Brodmann areas 10, 11 
and 47. 
OFC gets its name from the position immediately above the orbits. It’s 
involved in sensory integration, representing the affective value of reinforcers and 
in decision-making. Particularly, the OFC seems to be involved in expected 
rewards or punishment, thus making the OFC critical for adaptive learning. It has 
been less studied than other prefrontal cortex areas. This happened only in recent 
years with evidences from neuropsychology and neuroimaging. All these 
evidences provided information about the role and functions played by OFC. It 
links sensory integration function with the modulation of autonomic reactions and 
learning, prediction and decision making. OFC is part of the frontostriatal circuit 
with strong connections to the limbic system. For this reason it’s a region that 
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integrates affective and not affective information and which regulates the 
appetitive responses.  
The role of OFC in decision making processes was first understood in 
1848 thanks to the case of Phineas Gage, whose orbitofrontal cortex was 
penetrated by a metal rod. Phineas Gage survived but he completely changed 
personality. In recent years neuropsychology provided results concerning 
orbitofrontal cortex damage, reporting problems with decision making, lack of 
affect and social inappropriateness (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000).  
 
1.4.1    The development of Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
During childhood and adolescence many changes occur with a growth and 
modifications in myelination and synaptic density in the brain. Among the 
prefrontal structures some studies report that OFC develops earlier than 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g. Orzhekhovskaya, 1981).  
Recent evidences suggest that orbitofrontal structures continue to develop 
into adulthood, but that they first emerge during development, around the end of 
the first year of life; this is in contradiction to what was previously believed, that 
is: a prefrontal cortex functionality starting from 4-7 years old (Luria, 1973), or 
even starting from 12-15 years old (Golden, 1981).  
Gogtay et al (2004) (see fig. 1.4) found an early increase of gray matter 
volume, followed by sustained loss at puberty. According to the researchers the 
process of gray matter maturation (and loss at puberty) begins in dorsal parietal 
cortices,  goes on in the frontal, parietal, occipital ones, and ends in the temporal 
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cortex. Only in a final stage of maturation the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
involved, which starts to lose gray matter only at the end of adolescence. 
 
 
 
                        Fig. 1.4 (Source: Gogtay et al., 2004) 
 
 
In the second year of life children become more able to inhibit their 
answers during the Piagetian A-not-B search task (Piaget, 1954). Furthermore, 
some studies (Overman et al., 1996) demonstrated an improvement in young 
children’s performance in a task known as object reversal.1 Bell & Fox (1992) 
found also a correlation between frontal/parietal EEG coherence and the ability to 
tolerate delays of gratification. In order to measure the delays of gratification in 
young children, Thompson et al. (1997) employed a modified choice task. The 
                                               
 
1 Reversal Learning is a task in which participants are asked to give different responses according 
to the two conditions of reward and punishment. So they have to learn to change their answers in 
the game according to conditions in which previously rewarded stimuli are no longer rewarded and 
so on. 
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researchers found that 4 to 5 years old children in a task in which they are asked 
to choose between a small reward now or a larger after a delay of time, and in a 
task in which they had to choose between a reward for self now or for self and 
other after a delay of time, show altruistic behavior and ability to delay the 
gratification compared with 3-year-old children. Moore et al. (1998) found also a 
correlation between altruism and theory of mind (Premack &Woodruff, 1978). 
According to Happaney et al. (2004) OFC plays a role also in affective decision 
making. Kerr and Zelazo (2004) found that in the Iowa Gambling Task 3-year-old 
children performed in a disadvantageous way compared to 4-year-old children. 
And a better performance by 6 years olds compared with 3 and 4 year olds was 
shown in Garon and Moore’s (2004) experiment. Note that the relationships 
among delay of gratification, Theory of Mind abilities, Decision Making and 
Attachment have been investigated by Marchetti & Castelli (2012).  
Finally, Blair et al. (2001) investigated advantageous choice and 
correlation with age in a sample of participants aged  from 9 to 17. They found an 
inverse correlation between the two variables, which shows a development across 
age of the ability to make advantageous choice, and hence the development of 
OFC. 
The functions of OFC consist in an inhibitory role but also in a 
coordination of components of cognitive, emotional and behavioral regulation. 
This involves the evaluation of motivational signals, the ability to learn 
appropriate responses to rewarding and aversive stimuli, the registration and 
regulation of emotional states and the switch of behavior and responses. OFC 
plays a role also in working memory  (e.g., Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2001). 
14 
 
The best way to classify OFC’s regions is to divide them into the medial 
and lateral ones. The medial region is mainly involved in motivation (e.g. reward 
evaluation), being highly connected with limbic structures. The more anterior 
region is involved in behavioral inhibition and selection of responses (e.g. Bokura 
et al., 2001). This anterior region is more connected with the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Both regions are connected with the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), another very important region for executive functions, more 
involved in self-monitoring and error detection (e.g. Carter et al., 2000).  
For many researchers the development of executive functions occurs at 
around the age of 3-4, with the development of self-control and perspective 
taking. According some authors (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 1996) self-control also 
allows an early development of responsibility for actions.  
 
1.5 Counterfactual thinking in children 
 
Harris (1989) specifically claimed to consider the emotional development 
in close relationship to cognitive development. But given the strong dependence 
of counterfactual emotions from counterfactual thinking, children are able to 
experience these emotions only if they first have developed the skills in this type 
of thinking.   
There are conflicting ideas in the literature about when during child 
development counterfactual thinking emerges. Harris et al. (1996) and Riggs et al. 
(1998) claimed that children are able to think counterfactually when they are 
around 3 or 4 years old. In a typical experimental task children are asked what 
would have happened if things would have been different. For example, they see a 
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dirty floor and a doll with dirty shoes. So they are asked how is the floor now and 
whether it was dirty before the doll’s arrival. Then they are asked whether the 
floor would have been dirty if the doll would have removed her shoes.  
Some authors described implicit counterfactuals (Perner et al., 2004), 
referring to Gergely et al. (2002). But I agree with Beck, Riggs and Burns (2011), 
claiming that it makes sense to refer to counterfactual thinking only as an explicit 
process. Beck et al. (2011) described four types of counterfactuals. These 
counterfactuals are: generating alternative worlds, representing falsity as if it 
were true, representing multiple possibilities and comparing multiple possibilities 
(p. 111). 
So it initially appeared that three years old children would be able to 
reason counterfactually, as long as relying on short chains of action. However, 
this hypothesis has given way to the idea that this was the result of false positives. 
Children are based in fact, not so much on their ability to reason counterfactually 
but on their general knowledge of the world. Beck et al. (2010) attempted to 
check this hypothesis by reading to children some stories similar to those of 
German & Nichols (2003) in which a main character is initially presented as 
happy and then, running into bad luck, becomes sad. They do not replicate their 
results. Questions regarding short chains of events were not for children easier 
than those involving long chains of events.  
In a second experiment, Beck et al. (2010) found that short questions were 
for children more difficult than longer questions and short questions about 
emotions. This leads us to think that actually they base their answer on their 
general knowledge of the world, however in case of questions of long chains of 
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causal action their performance are not due to skills they possess. Beck et al. 
(2010) do not, however, report sufficient evidence in favour of any specific 
hypothesis. 
The authors claimed the children were not able to reason counterfactually 
not because of the length of chains of events but rather because of the 
development of language skills.  
Robinson & Beck (2000) argue that for the emergence of counterfactual 
thinking is also necessary to have a sufficiently developed inhibitory control 
system. This is because counterfactual reasoning implies to resist in considering 
the reality and to rely on what might happen. Children make mistakes due to the 
fact that they refer to reality instead of chance. So they can’t inhibit the answer 
concerning reality instead of the answer concerning what might happen.  
Beck et al. (2009) report that children who are not yet able to represent 
counterfactual thinking as a “double chance” didn’t experience it. This concept of 
“double possibility” refers to a certain point in time where it is not yet clear the 
result of a decision and any outcome can possibly occur: one of these possibilities 
will then become reality while the alternative one doesn’t manifest. According to 
Beck et al. (2006) it’s only from the age of six that children are able to imagine 
counterfactual thinking as a “double chance”. According to Rafetseder et al. 
(2010), children up to five / six years old do not think in a counterfactual way but 
adopt other strategies such as conditional or logical reasoning. 
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1.6   The Development of the emotions of regret and relief 
 
Once children are able to think counterfactually and have an adequately developed 
inhibitory control, they should be able to understand and report counterfactual 
emotions. Between three and six years of age children develop the skills required 
for the emergence of regret and relief. It’s important to underlie that 
counterfactual thinking is a necessary condition but not sufficient for the 
development of counterfactual emotions.  
As I mentioned before, the experience of regret may have an adaptive 
function and so may have a role of “learning from the experience”. If the actions 
of an individual lead to undesirable results, it is assumed that the same individual 
will no longer act in that way, in similar conditions.  
Amsel and Smalley (2000) investigated for the first time the age at which a 
child begins to understand that an agent feels the emotion of regret or to feel 
himself this emotion. The investigation of counterfactual reasoning in child 
development has been generally conducted in literature using story telling in 
which children are asked to judge an event as the actual target that would have 
been different changing his antecedent (forward counterfactual reasoning) or its 
subsequent (backward counterfactual reasoning). The distinction between 
representing and reasoning about counterfactual states and the way in which this 
distinction has an influence on counterfactual thinking and the emotional 
evaluation is really crucial to assess the impact of counterfactual thinking on 
emotional evaluation.  
The four studies designed by Amsel et al. (2003) investigate regret, but 
also relief (defined by the authors as elation, but see chapter 2 for a distinction). In 
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each of them children are given an initial question concerning the emotion of an 
agent (both in Self and in  Other condition) as a result of a choice between two 
options. Subsequently, the alternative choice is revealed, and then the question 
about how the agent feels now about the outcome of the un-chosen option is 
asked.  
Evidence of child ability to represent and reason about a possible state of 
things is obtained through the difference between the first question and the last 
question (counterfactual). Specifically, children must demonstrate an ability to 
judge the agent happier or sadder with an undesirable or a desirable outcome with 
respect to an undesirable or not selected one. In order to claim that preschoolers 
are able to manage counterfactual emotions the authors support the hypothesis 
that they have to feel differently in response to the original question with respect 
to the final one.  
 
1.6.1 The role of the alternative outcomes for the emergence of regret 
 
The aim of Amsel et al. (2003) was to investigate when children judge the 
counterfactual-based emotion of regret in others and when they themselves 
experience it. In each of four studies, participants were asked an Initial Question 
about the happiness of an agent (self or other) regarding the consequence of 
having selected one of two options. For example, in Studies 1 and 2, agents 
selected and opened only one of two boxes and in Studies 3 and 4, agents turned 
over one of two face-down cards in a card game against a rival who had been 
dealt a face-up card.  Then, the unselected option (gift box or card) was revealed 
19 
 
and it was shown that it would have produced a more or less desired consequence 
than the selected option. 
In Self conditions the experimenter introduced two dolls representing two 
agents of the same sex of the participants. Close to the dolls were placed two 
boxes. They were said to be gift boxes. They contained a plastic figurine for 
children and $ 5 for adults. The evaluation of the agent’s happiness in relation to 
the choice consists of a 4-point scale represented by 4 smileys: not at all happy, a 
little happy, pretty happy or very happy. After the presentation of the scale they 
were asked the first question: “How happy is (name of the doll) with the gift 
received?”. So the alternative outcome was revealed and they were asked to report 
how happy is the doll again. The participants were randomly assigned to two 
conditions. One was the condition with the alternative outcome as a better gift 
than received and the other one was the condition with a worse alternative 
outcome compared with the gift received. The evaluation of the feelings of the 
agent was asked after revealing the content of the not chosen box and the 
counterfactual question was asked: “How much would have been happy (name of) 
if he/she had chosen the other box?”. This was followed by a final question: “How 
happy is now (name of) with the gift received?”. It would be a repetition of the 
initial question, but after knowing the alternatives. 
The authors examined the differences in the answers to the initial question 
and the counterfactual question in order to examine if the participants gave 
different judgments before and after discovering the contents of the not chosen 
box. Their results revealed a significant effect of the alternative outcome: if it was 
positive, the main character was judged happier than the protagonist getting a 
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negative alternative result, all in relation to the given answers in response to the 
counterfactual question compared to the original question. This effect was seen in 
all the age groups. 
The qualitative analysis suggests to authors that pre-school children as 
well as adults judged the feelings of the protagonist on possible states of things. A 
second analysis assesses the differences in the initial and final answer to the 
question, and so the judgments about the feelings of the protagonists in relation to 
the fact that it was revealed the contents of the not selected box. Through the 
results of this study they assumed that young children represent themselves and 
think like adults with regard to the feelings of the protagonists in relation to states 
of things that could have happened. Counterfactual thinking, therefore, is thought 
to be possessed even by very young children. 
Other researchers have also become interested in the emergence of 
counterfactual thinking in preschool children, claiming that the visible change at 
4/5 years regarding the counterfactual reasoning is due to several factors: (i) an 
increase in the mental capacity of children to represent explicitly and reason about 
real alternatives, (ii) the acquisition of the ability to imagine alternatives to reality, 
besides those involving only negative outcomes, (iii) the acquisition of the ability 
to think about alternative states of affairs. 
The idea to test is the possibility that children think about an alternative 
world but not in connection with the real one, and that they actually give a 
judgment on the amount of gift received instead of reporting a counterfactual 
emotion. In order to test this hypothesis, Amsel et al. (2003) ran another 
experiment, with the presence of detail information about the agent. 
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1.6.2 The effect of providing additional information about the agent 
 
This study examines the influence of the factual and counterfactual outcomes on 
the opinions of children about the happiness of the protagonists. The procedure is 
similar to the study 1, but the content of the two boxes changes, which is now the 
same for children and for adults. In addition, once selected the box, participants 
are given details about the protagonist of the choice. 
This information corresponds to counterfactual information concerning a 
gift that is worth more or less than the one that the protagonist could have 
received; factual information concerning the level of satisfaction of the 
protagonist in relation to the gift received (in this case, for example, how recently 
the protagonist had eaten if the box contained a dessert, or played if the box 
contained a figurine). 
This new information is used to influence the opinions of the participants 
on the protagonist’s feelings about a state of affairs that has no direct reference to 
mental or psychological states of the characters. This allows a fair comparison 
between the factual and counterfactual account in making emotional judgments. 
Amsel et al. (2003) expected that college students but not pre-school 
children would have modified their initial judgments about the happiness of the 
protagonist after receiving the gift (sweet or present) if they were given additional 
counterfactual information and that the initial judgments for both the age groups 
were affected by additional factual information concerning the level of 
satisfaction of the protagonist. 
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The procedure consisted in presenting one at the time four dolls of the 
same sex of the participant to whom was given the opportunity to choose between 
two boxes. Then the experimenter explained to participants that they had to judge 
the feelings of the dolls about the gifts received (initial question). After evaluating 
the emotion of the protagonist, participants were given, at the same time, the 
factual or the counterfactual information. 
The factual information was positive for half of the protagonists, then the 
prize received was very appreciated because in this case the dolls had not eaten / 
played recently, but for the other half the factual information was negative.  
After giving the new information, they were asked a question about the 
feelings of the protagonists in the light of the acquired information and lastly the 
final question, a repetition of the initial one. So there were eight groups of 
participants who received respectively: a) factual or counterfactual information; b) 
a sweet or a present shown first; c) initial positive or negative information. 
This study replicated the results of the study 1 showing the lack of effect 
of counterfactual information on children’s judgment about the happiness of a 
protagonist. This cannot be said about the new factual information, who had an 
effect on judgments both for children and adults about the happiness of the 
protagonist, although in different sizes. 
The different influence of factual or counterfactual information allows us 
to conclude that children in this second study are unwilling to change their 
judgments about the level of happiness of a protagonist in the light of new 
information. The results, however, leave open the question of why the 
counterfactual information has not an effect in both first and second study of 
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Amsel et al. (2003). One possibility is that children do not make judgments about 
their feelings, but they judge those of another protagonist.  
 
1.6.3 Making judgment about own feelings  
 
In light of the results of the study 2, Amsel et al. (2003) asked children to make a 
judgment of regret and elation in a card game in which they won some stickers. 
Participants played against the experimenter with cards ranging from 0 to 5 
points. Participants were given two faced down cards while the experimenter had 
one card faced up.  Who had the card with the highest score was the winner. One 
of the two cards of the participants had always the same score of the experimenter, 
while the other card was higher or lower. The counterfactual question was asked 
after seeing the not selected card. 
The differences from previous studies in the evaluation of the emotions 
was that the scale included a neutral smiley. In addition, before starting the 
experiment, there was a training game consisting of three hands, one in which 
participants win, one in which the experimenter is the winner and one in which 
cards are the same, to test the understanding of the game, in which the simple 
question: “Who wins?” is asked. Participants were excluded from the study if they 
answered incorrectly to more than one question. In two hands the alternative card 
was the better choice.   
The initial question was “How do you feel about the card that you chose? 
Happy, sad or neither sad nor happy?”. Then the non-chosen card was turned and 
the counterfactual question was asked: “How would you have felt if you had 
chosen the not selected card?”. This was followed by the final question: “How do 
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you feel now about the card you chose?”. This last question was slightly different 
from the initial one, introducing the adverb “now” with the dual purpose of asking 
a different questions in order to eliminate the reluctance of participants to change 
their response and emphasize the word “now”, allowing participants to change 
their answer. At the end of the game participants were asked to say the number of 
the selected card. 
What emerges from this third study is that children are influenced in their 
judgments about their current emotions by understanding quickly the information 
on alternative states of affairs. Methodological artefacts are excluded and they 
assumed that the emergence of regret and elation attributed to themselves or 
others occur simultaneously. Moreover, preschoolers are unable or ignore the 
value of taking into account an alternative state of affairs in their judgments of 
actual emotional states. 
 
1.6.4  Other- and self-attribution of counterfactual emotions: which come first? 
 
In their last study Amsel et al. (2003) asked participants to judge their level of 
happiness and the level of happiness of another agent in a task similar to study 3. 
The purpose is to determine whether the capacity to self-attribute counterfactual 
emotions emerges in development in advance of the capacity to attribute them to 
others, or if there is no self/other asymmetry in development.  
The agent is Billie, a plush character with no facial expression, who played 
against participants instead of the experimenter. There are eight trials, four in 
which participants receive two cards and they select one, and the other four in 
which Billie receives two cards and he selects one. In all hands participants are 
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asked to judge the feelings of the agent in relation to the chosen card before and 
after seeing it.  
The questions are now different. The initial question represents a judgment 
on the agent’s feelings about a potential win or loss, and the final question focuses 
on the direction in which participants change the evaluations of the feelings of the 
agent once they discovered the value of the not selected card. 
In four hands participants are asked to judge their feelings after winning, 
when they could have lost; and a judgment about their feelings after losing, when 
they could have won. In the other four hands participants are asked to report 
Billie’s emotions after winning when he could have lost; and after losing when he 
could have won. The idea was that children’s judgments of regret and elation both 
for self and others, would have appeared simultaneously, thus reflecting a 
conceptual view of these emotions based on a counterfactual prediction based on 
Wimmer et al. (1991), who claim that the simultaneous emergence of false belief 
comprehension in self and others reflects children’s conceptual understanding of 
mental states. They also included two phases of pretest. The first assessed whether 
children would have judged the psychological expectations as an enhancer of the 
feelings of happiness and sadness, in two fictive scenarios, one in which Billie 
receives a gift, which is better than expected; the other in which Billie gets hurt a 
finger and so he feels worse than expected.  
The second phase of pretest evaluated participants ability in playing cards. 
In four of the eight hands participants selected one of two upturned cards and they 
compared it with Billie’s cards. They won and lost at least two times out of four. 
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In the other four hands Billie received cards and he selected one to be compared 
with experimenter’s card.  
After revealing the selected card, there were three questions. The initial 
one: “How do you feel / how does Billie feel after turning the card?”. The 
counterfactual question after shooting the not selected card: “Who would win the 
sticker if you / Billie chose this card and not the one you / Billie selected? Billie, 
you or nobody?”. 
The counterfactual question is not about the feelings of the agent (as in 
studies 1 and 3). The final question is asked after covering the unselected card: 
“Do you remember you said that you were (Billie was) happy/sad after shooting 
the card? Now you (Billie) saw the unselected card. How do you (Billie) feel 
about your (his) choice? Do you (Billie) feel happier/sadder than before, the same 
as before, or less happy/sad than before?” 
According to these results, the recognition of the two counterfactual 
emotions is not possible before 5-6 years of age. Data also show a simultaneous 
emergence of the ability to attribute counterfactual emotions to self and others. 
According to the authors, the simultaneous emergence of the capacity to  
make judgments of regret and elation for self and others depends on young 
children’s gaining insight, over time, about the value and significance of bringing 
knowledge about the possible world to bear on assessments of an agent’s feelings 
about the real world. 
In order to attribute regret to themselves and to others children need two 
components. One is the ability to reason and to represent the feelings of an agent 
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with respect to unrealized possibilities. Another is the influence of thinking about 
these possible states of affairs when judging the current ones. 
 
1.7  Thinking about the emotional responses of another agent 
 
 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) designed three experiments in order to test the 
understanding of regret and relief in children. Participants are asked to make 
decisions with respect to the emotional responses of other agents. The focus of the 
study is therefore on children’s attribution of counterfactual emotions to others 
rather than to themselves. The authors used in this study a measure similar to the 
Counterfactual Inference Test (Hooker, Roese and Park, 2000). Participants are 
presented a few stories describing the experience of two characters who get 
outcomes as a result of decisions made. The stories always contain an element that 
differentiates the two characters, which is relevant for judging regret and relief. 
The task of the participants was to judge whether the characters in the story would 
have felt in the same way with respect to the results obtained, or if one or the 
other would have felt better or worse. 
Unlike Amsel et al. (2003) who measured if the intensity of an emotional 
response varies when a participant finds out what might have happened if he had 
made a different choice, Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) simply measured if children 
are able to judge a protagonist in a different way than another character. Previous 
research suggests that for children, such comparisons are easy to make and tasks 
relating to such judgments are useful as sensitive measures of child emotion 
understanding. 
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1.8 The mutability of an event and the experience of regret 
 
The experiment one of Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) examines the understanding 
of one or more aspects of the way in which the situational factors have an 
influence on the emotional responses based on counterfactual reasoning. Previous 
research suggests that when we compare two situations in which what might 
happen is better than what has occurred, adults experience regret more frequently 
and with more intensity when the event occurred is actually cognitively highly 
mutable. 
One factor influencing the mutability of an event is the typical action that 
produces negative results: atypical action is more mutable than a typical course of 
action. A negative result will produce a more intense emotion of regret if we opt 
for an atypical course of action than for a typical course of action.  
The experiment consists of four stories about two characters who take a 
decision with respect to two possible courses of action. The general characteristics 
of the situation, the results and possible alternative were the same for both 
characters: the only difference concerned the nature of their decisions. In one 
case, the course of action chosen by both characters was described as typical for 
an agent and atypical for another. In the other two stories the difference between 
the two characters was that one chooses to implement a certain behavior while the 
other chooses to not act at all. The participants were 18 five-year-old, 25 seven 
years old, 54 aged 9 and 83 adults. In line with Amsel et al. (2003), 5-year-old 
children fail to consider alternatives when making a decision.  
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In summary, two of the four stories described a typical course of action for 
one of the protagonists and an atypical course of action for the other two stories. 
A third pair of stories exposed the protagonist’s action to an intentional act while 
in the last two stories the protagonist was not acting at all. Three categories of 
explanation were used in order to justify why the protagonists felt worse in some 
situations. The first was focused on the choice or on the alternative outcomes. The 
second one was focused on the story or something reported about the protagonist 
and the third was not to give any explanation. Other three categories were 
provided to explain why the characters felt the same way: 1) the results were the 
same for both characters; 2) choices or decisions of both characters; 3) no reasons 
why.  
They also examined the way in which the mutability (typical/atypical 
action and acts of commission/omission) has no effect on emotional responses and 
negative outcomes.  The decision making patterns of children aged 7 don’t 
coincide with those of adults. Starting at 7 years old children are sensitive to the 
nature of the situational factors that influence the mutability of events. Children at 
5 years old feel the same regardless of the situational factors. At this age it is not 
clear how a counterfactuals can influence the emotional responses. 
 
1.9 The importance of alternative courses of action 
In the same study, Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) focused on “what could have 
happened”. The alternative courses of action were not the same for the two 
protagonists of the stories: for one of them was better, for the other was not 
different from the actual course of action. The structure of the story was organized 
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in order to maximize the salience of critical elements relevant to the experience of 
regret. A series of questions to verify the understanding of the story and the recall 
of critical details were added. 
There were 18 participants aged 5 and 18 adults. The results showed that 
adults judged the feelings of the protagonist as more negative, while children 
reported that is the character who isn’t the protagonist of the choice to feel worse. 
Adults judged the protagonist of the choice as the character who felt worse 
because the other decision would lead to better outcomes, while children thought 
that the non-target character was the one who felt worse because things would 
have gone wrong anyway, regardless of the choices made. Authors suggest that 
children seem to base their judgments on the quality of the outcomes only. 
 
1.10 The experience of relief 
In their third study, Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) inserted a neutral response and a 
positive instead of a negative one. While the emotion of regret is felt when the 
obtained outcome is more negative than a possible alternative, the emotion of 
relief is the result of a positive or a neutral outcome when the alternative is worse. 
The procedure is similar to the experiment one: participants (17 aged 
seven and 18 adults)  are told two stories in which two characters get more neutral 
results avoiding negative. In the first story the protagonist avoids a negative result 
through a typical action, while another character avoids a negative result through 
an atypical action. In the second story the protagonist avoids a negative result 
doing an action, and the other through a “non-action”.  
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What emerges is that negative results stimulate more counterfactual 
thinking than neutral or positive results. 
 
1.11  Possible explanations for the discrepancy in the emergence of regret 
and relief 
Weisberg and Beck (2011) used an experimental procedure similar to the one of 
Amsel et al. (2000). A previous study (Weisberg and Beck 2010) had showed that 
regret emerges at five years old while relief at seven, suggesting three hypotheses 
about the causes of this gap: 1) the development of relief would take place later; 
2) the evidence regarding the emergence of relief are more difficult to test; 3) the 
evidence for regret are the result of false positives. 
Authors claimed that in order to experience a counterfactual emotion it is 
necessary to keep in mind two alternatives: the reality and the counterfactual 
world, and also to understand that they are both possible. Regret and relief are, 
among this type of emotions, both the result of a comparison between reality and 
something better, in the case of regret, or something worse, in the case of relief.  
So, the focus of their study is to identify the reasons for the lag between 
regret and relief, which the authors summed up in three causes: a) actual delay for 
relief; b) methodological limitations of the studies; c) children’s evidence for 
regret as false positives. 
They claimed that the notion of negativity bias suggests that the relevance, 
power and predominance of negative events more easily trigger a reaction and 
perhaps counterfactual thinking. And this supports the idea of the first cause, 
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among the three mentioned, as the more probable reason for the lag between 
regret and relief. 
 They recruited 55 participants aged 4-5, 52 of 5-6 years old and 55 aged 6-
7. Everyone perform a pretest in which the understanding of the 5-point rating 
scale, with 6 rounds of training measuring the happiness of the protagonist. 
Participants were shown two face down cards and they had to choose between the 
two. They could win or lose a number of tokens according to their choice. The 
following question  is related to their feelings about the choice of the card. So the 
not chosen card was turned over and questions about their feelings were asked 
again. They changed the evaluation scale used before (see fig.1.6), introducing 
three arrows underneath (see fig.1.7).  
                   
fig. 1.6 from Weisberg and Beck (2010)                     fig. 1.7 from Weisberg and Beck (2011) 
 
Children were asked to rate their emotions (first evaluation) and then to 
rate their emotions again (second evaluation), using the arrows in order to point 
left or right if they want to rate “even sadder” or “even happier” or “the same” of 
the smileys. They also introduced regret and relief trials always with initial win, in 
which children won something but the alternative was better (regret) or worse 
(relief) and regret and relief trials with an initial loss, but with a best alternative 
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(regret) or a worst (relief). Children were also provided with feedbacks based on 
the correct or incorrect responses in the training procedure.  
Only in regret trial with an initial win children aged 4-5 were able to feel 
regret. They also obtained for relief trial with an initial loss the experience of 
relief at 5-6 years old.   
In order to manipulate the responsibility for the outcome, Weisberg and 
Beck (2011) designed a second experiment in which children were presented with 
three conditions. They used a between subject design. The first condition, named 
“choice”, represents a replication of the experiment one, in which children chose 
one of two cards to turn over. The second condition is  named “no choice-
experimenter”. The experimenter rolls one dice in order to determine the 
participant’s card. In the third condition, named “no choice-child”, the participant 
rolls a dice which determines his/her card.  
 101 participants aged 5-6, 94 children of 6-7 years old and 102 aged 7-8 
were involved in this experiment. Once having completed the experiment one, 
they were assigned to one of the three conditions. After the card was turned over, 
children were presented with the original question: “How do you feel about the 
card you got?” And the participants chose the point on the scale that best matched 
their feelings. Then the other card was revealed and they were presented with the 
question and the scale again.  
Results show that children are more likely to experience positive or 
negative counterfactual emotions if they are more responsible. In this second 
experiment both regret and relief are emotions that children are able to experience 
starting at 5-6 years old.  
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1.12 The addition of a baseline 
 
O’Connor et al. (2012) introduced two methodological changes to Weisberg and 
Beck (2010) experiment. They introduced a baseline in order to measure the 
understanding of regret avoiding a first and a second evaluation after the choice 
and they used the three arrows employed by Weisberg and Beck (2011) 
experiment. 
 In a first experiment they involved 20 children aged 4-5, 16 aged 6-7 and 
24 aged 8-9. As in Weisberg and Beck (2010) experiment, participants selected 
one of two boxes to win a prize. They also introduced a baseline, consisting in a 
trial in which children had to evaluate their emotions after their choice comparing 
it with a same outcome as counterfactual prize. They found evidence for regret in 
the age group of 6-7 years old and 8-9. Both these age groups were also able to 
explain their change in feelings because of the greater desirability of the 
counterfactual outcome. They obtained an increase of the reported counterfactual 
children for trials in which participants received the baseline first.  
 In a second experiment they still used the baseline, because of the results 
of the experiment one and they introduced three arrows as Weisberg and Beck 
(2011) did, in order to ask children to evaluate their emotions as even sadder, even 
happier of the same. All children received the baseline trial first. There were 18 
children aged 4-5, 29 aged 6-7 years old and 31 aged 8-9.  Results of experiment 
2 confirmed those of experiment 1. Children were able to feel regret starting at 6 
years old.  
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1.13 The role of executive functions 
 
Burns et al. (2012) argue that the late emergence of regret in children compared to 
counterfactual thinking is due to the fact that they are asked to keep in mind at the 
same time two representations of reality (actual and counterfactual). In order to 
test this hypothesis they designed two tasks for regret and four tests for all 
components of the executive functions.  
In their study they investigated the relationship between the emergence of 
counterfactual emotions in early childhood and the development of executive 
functions
2
. Authors believe that the differences in the development of executive 
functions predict the emergence of the experience of regret in young children. 
They  adopted two methods in order to study the development of regret. The first, 
from Guttentag and Ferrell (2004), assessed the ability, in children, of attributing 
the experience of regret to others. The second approach aims to examine when 
children are able to feel regret in response to events that affect themselves 
(employing the same methodology as in the experiment of Weisberg and Beck, 
2010). 
This was the first study investigating the correlation between executive 
control and counterfactual emotions. The hypothesis is to test if individual 
differences in executive functions, particularly working memory and cognitive 
flexibility, are predictors or not of the experience of regret in children. 
Counterfactual reasoning requires a cognitive flexibility in order to shift 
the focus from counterfactual to reality. It was also noted that at the same age in 
                                               
 
2
 The executive functions can be contained in three distinct but related components: 1) updating 
and monitoring; 2) inhibitory control; 3) ability of switching. 
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which children experience regret there is also an improvement in working 
memory and cognitive flexibility. Beck et al. (2009) found that correct answers to 
counterfactual questions were related to ability in inhibitory control: what children 
found difficult in reasoning about false antecedents was inhibiting the actual 
knowledge about the world. 
In order to test the relation between regret and executive control, Burns et 
al. (2012) propose to investigate executive functions (working memory, inhibitory 
control and switching), the experience of regret through a shortened and adapted 
version of the experiment of Weisberg and Beck (2010), and a measurement of 
the attribution to others of the emotions of regret through a study similar to that of 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004). 
They tested 104 children from the age of four to seven. All participants 
perform two test sessions: one on executive functions and the other on regret and 
counterfactual reasoning. The first session consisted of four tasks in order to test 
the three components of executive functions: two tasks of working memory, one 
of switching and one of inhibitory control. The tasks were performed in the same 
order for each participant. 
The second session includes four types of tasks: 1) Boxes game, used by 
Amsel et al. (2000) and extended by Weisberg and Beck (2010); 2) Stories task, 
adapted from Guttentag and Ferrell (2004); 3) Marble game. test on counterfactual 
reasoning adapted from Beck et al. (2006).  
Their results indicate that switching and not the task of working memory or 
inhibition is a strong predictor of regret. 
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 They claimed that the experience of regret may require a certain amount of 
working memory, despite individual differences in working memory of their 
sample are not predictive of the experience of regret. But they also claimed that 
the role of working memory in relation to counterfactual thinking could have been 
overestimated by previous researches. Furthermore, this study indicates that 
cognitive processes, in particular the control of attention and behavior, are 
inherently involved in complex emotional experiences.  
 
1.14. Evidences for false positives in previous studies? 
 
Rafetsder and Perner (2012) designed four experiments in order to control, 
according to them, for all the alternative interpretations about the age at which 
children experience the emotion of regret. They described the participation of 16 
children aged 3-4 and 21 children from the age of 5 to 6 in their first experiment. 
Children chose between two boxes and they were told that they could keep the 
contents. In the dependent condition participants were asked to report their 
feelings before seeing and after seeing the content of the not chosen box. In the 
independent condition children had to rate their feelings only after opening the not 
selected box. There were two sessions with the presentation of dependent or 
independent condition in a counterbalanced order. They used two identical boxes, 
with a barrier in the middle for each one. One side of the box contained always 
one candy and the other side always five candies. Children were said to choose 
between the two boxes and after their choice they were always presented with the 
side of the box with less candies. So experimenter opened the side containing one 
candy instead of five, independently from child’s choice. After their choice they 
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were said “Oh, there is one candy. It’s yours now”. Then they were asked the 
baseline question: “How happy are you with your one candy? Can you show me 
on our scale?’’. So, they were said: ‘‘Now I am going to show you what is in the 
other box. Oh, look! There are five candies in it’’. In the dependent condition they 
were asked: ‘‘Now that you know that you could have got five candies, how 
happy are you with your one candy? Can you show me on our scale?’’. In the 
independent condition, after the opening of the chosen box, children were said: 
“Oh, there is one candy. It’s yours now. Now I am going to show you what is in 
the other box. Oh, look! There are five candies in it’’. So they were asked: “How 
happy are you with your one candy?  Can you show me on our scale?”.   
They introduced a new emotional evaluation scale, made of 8-point smiley 
faces from very happy to very sad. In this experiment children were not 
influenced by the knowledge of the alternative outcome in either of the two 
conditions. They finally found evidences for regret at the age of 9.  
 
1.15. Overall conclusions and introduction to experimental research 
 
As we have seen, the established literature on the development of regret and relief 
has produced contrasting results and lots of open questions. I think this is due both 
to methodological problems and to different ideas of what can be defined 
“counterfactual”. There is also another point that I’ll mention at the end, in the 
general conclusions. 
In my research I tried first to replicate Weisberg and Beck’s paradigm 
(2010) (see Study I), which was according to me the best available paradigm on 
the development of counterfactual emotions. Children were provided with two 
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boxes in a game in which they could win or lose stickers. Their paradigm 
provided also children with an emotional evaluation on a five point Likert Scale 
made of smileys, so including the neutral smiley, as Amsel et al. (2003) did 
before. They measure both negative and positive counterfactual emotions, 
defining the positive counterfactual emotion as relief instead of elation as Amsel 
et al. (2003) did.  
My experiments introduced methodological changes. All developmental 
studies employed a first and a second emotional evaluation. I propose a final 
emotional evaluation only, with both the chosen and the unchosen outcome 
available and in front of participants all the time, also when children are asked to 
report their emotions. As a consequence, children are provided with a choice 
without ambiguity: they can see the content of the boxes all the time. The boxes 
are transparent instead of the closed boxes used in previous studies. So 
participants are presented with their content immediately and for all the duration 
of each trial, instead of seeing the chosen and the unchosen content after the 
choice only. I also defined two conditions, one called partial (when the game is 
played with only one of the two boxes) and one called complete (when the game 
is played with both boxes). According to these definition, the partial condition 
may elicit disappointment and elation while the complete condition may elicit 
regret and relief, as in Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005).  
Children are at last involved in trials where they can opt for a safe choice 
(choosing the box which give the opportunity to win something for sure) or for a 
risky choice (choosing the box that gives the opportunity to win a high amount of 
tokens or nothing).  
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My experimental work is described in five chapters. The first experimental 
chapter (Chapter 2) reports Weisberg and Beck (2010) replication’s results. The 
second one (Chapter 3) explores the possibility for a lag between regret and relief 
or for a simultaneous emergence of the two counterfactual emotions. Chapter 4 
aims to study the difference in the experience of counterfactual emotions between 
being completely responsible for a choice (agency condition) and not being 
responsible at all (no agency condition). I examined the relationship between 
attributing counterfactual emotions to self or to others in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 
6 I examined the difference in counterfactual emotions between playing the game 
alone (Regret or Relief conditions) or playing against another child (Envy or 
Gloating conditions). 
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY I 
 
The experiment in this chapter is part of the paper named: 
 
Guerini, R., Coricelli, G. (in preparation). Regret and Relief in 3- to 10-year-old 
Children: The Ontogenesis of Counterfactual Emotions and the «Agency Effect». 
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2. STUDY I: REPLICATION OF WEISBERG AND BECK’S EXPERIMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Counterfactual emotions are higher order emotions and they are closely linked to 
counterfactual thinking. Every day we experience counterfactual thinking in many 
of its forms: for example, if we lose a train, if we are late for an appointment or 
when we simply do what we after realize to be «a wrong choice». What is 
common to all these situations is the negative emotion that goes with it, or 
positive in the case in which, however, things are going well and then we save 
ourselves from a negative result. 
Counterfactual thinking underlies all these cases, as it is to think of 
imaginary alternatives. Specifically, if we experience regret, we compare the 
reality with the best alternative to it (upwards counterfactual thinking), whereas if 
alternatives to actually turn out to be worse, we may experience relief 
(downwards counterfactual thinking) (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman & McMullen, 1993). 
Much was investigated in recent years about counterfactual emotions in 
adults. But it was not the same for children. Few studies were run, which showed 
contrasting results and have used different methods of investigation. The first was 
Amsel and Smalley (2000) study. They tested 3- to 5-year-old children and a 
group of adults in four studies. One of them has provided two protagonists (dolls) 
opening two boxes in order to win something. Each doll opened one of the boxes, 
saw the content and participants had to rate how she felt on a 4-point scale. 
43 
 
Afterwards they opened the unchosen box and after having seen the content they 
rated how the protagonist felt again. 
Their study tested also counterfactual thinking and they found that starting 
from 3 years old children were able to think counterfactually, but they were 
unable until the age of 5 to change the ratings in the final question after seeing the 
content of the unchosen box.    
In another study participants had to choose one of two face-down cards 
trying to beat the experimenter. Children were asked to rate their feelings about 
the selected and the unselected card for each trial of the game. The 3- to 5-year 
olds’ ratings of the chosen card did not change after seeing the unselected card. 
Amsel and Smalley’s results showed that children aged 3- to 5 were not able to 
experience regret or relief or to report that a protagonist is feeling regret or relief.  
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) used stories to investigate children’s report of 
counterfactual emotions. In three experiments they investigated in 5-, 7-, 9- year- 
old children and adults their abilities to infer that a protagonist could experience 
regret and relief in performing atypical and typical actions. Their results were that 
children didn’t experience regret until the age of 7 and they didn’t find any 
evidence of relief.   
Weisberg and Beck (2010) investigated the development of regret and 
relief in 5- to 8- year old children using a similar methodology as Amsel and 
Smalley (2000). They found that children are not able to experience regret until 
the age of 5 and relief until 7 and to attribute these emotions to others until 7.   
They concluded that both the lag between regret and relief and the dissociation 
between experience and understanding the two counterfactual emotions need to be 
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more investigated in order to understand at what age children are able to think 
counterfactually as adults. 
Ferrell et al. (2009) investigated the role of salience in counterfactual 
alternatives in order to understand regret and relief. Their hypothesis was that it’s 
more simple to reason counterfactually after a negative outcome instead of a 
positive outcome, and then that if children were provided with a prompt they 
could reason counterfactually and experience counterfactual emotions before the 
age of 7. They created “low salience” and “high salience” stories in which there 
were two protagonists obtaining the same outcome after the same decisions, but 
one of them could have obtained another outcome taking another decision and it 
would not have been the same for the other protagonist. They didn’t observe any 
evidence of regret before the age of 7.  
In our first experiment we aimed to replicate Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) 
results, using their same method. 
 
Experiment  I 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
We tested 60 children (31 girls, 29 boys) aged 3 to 8. Children were divided in 
three groups of age: 3-4 (M= 3 years, 5 months; DS= .51); 5-6 (M= 5 years, 6 
months; DS= .53) and 7-8 (M= 7 years, 2 months; DS= .49).  
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Materials 
 
We used a 5-point scale for rating emotions from “very sad” to “very happy” and 
two boxes placed on a table (see fig. 2.1), 25 cm from each participant. Data were 
collected in a quiet room. Children were tested individually. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Boxes and emotional scale 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were explained the emotional evaluation scale and they were asked to 
rate the very sad face, the sad, that neither sad nor happy, the happy, the very 
happy face in a random order for each child. Several attempts were granted until it 
was clear that the child was able to understand the scale. Children who have 
presented difficulties in understanding the scale were excluded from the sample (2 
children aged 3). They were presented the boxes and it was explained that they 
had to choose one of the two closed boxes arranged on the table, which contained 
different amount of stickers. The experimental session was preceded by 
familiarization trials in order to be sure that the child had understood the task.  
After children’s choice, the box was opened (see fig. 2.2) and they had to 
rate on the 5-point scale how they felt. The alternative box was opened (see fig. 
2.3) and they had to do an emotional evaluation again. Four trials were run. 
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Experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was following the 
participant choice and that “the alternative choice could have been his outcome 
but he/she didn’t choose that box”.  
 
                                             
Figure 2.2 Opening the chosen box                                  Figure 2.3. Opening the unchosen box  
                                
Results and discussion 
To analyze the data, in line with the procedure used by Weisberg and Beck 
(2010), we subtracted the initial score (baseline), reported on the scale of 
emotional evaluation, from the final score, in order to have a score difference 
between -4 and +4. The scores below zero indicated that participants were less 
happy for the choice of the box after seeing the contents of the alternative box (the 
one not chosen). This indicated regret. Scores above zero indicated instead relief. 
This was followed by a 3 (Age: 3-4, 5-6 and 7-8) x 2 (Task: Regret or 
Relief) analysis of variance (ANOVA). For post hoc analysis we used Tukey’s 
test in order to measure the significant interaction between task and age. The 
results showed a main effect for the task (F1, 57 = 387.27, p <.001, partial 
2 
= 
.343), a main effect for age (F2, 57 = 50.46, p <.001, partial 
2 
= .639) and a 
significant interaction between the type of task and age (F2, 57 = 179.95, p <.001, 
2 = .863). To analyze the significant interaction Tukey’s post hoc test were 
performed. 
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The results showed significant differences between the means of affective 
scores of children aged 3-4 with the means of the group aged 5-6 and 7-8 for 
Regret condition. We did not find a significant difference between the 5-6 age 
group and 7-8 age group. For Relief condition, there were significant comparisons 
between means of children aged 3-4 compared with the group of 7-8 years old. 
There weren’t significant differences between the means of children aged 3-4 and 
5-6 years old (see fig. 2.4).  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Means of children for each group 
 
The obtained results confirm the possibility that regret may be an emotion 
experienced by children from the age of 5, in continuity to the results obtained by 
Weisberg and Beck (2010) and differently from the results obtained by Guttentag 
and Ferrell (2004) and Amsel and Smalley (2000; 2003). In the range of 3-4 years 
old children demonstrate to not understand this type of emotion: the responses 
between the first and the second evaluation do not differ or are discordant in the 
sense of having a positive connotation in both cases. A significant change is found 
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on the contrary for the age group 5-6, in which it is quite clear that the child is 
able to experience this emotion. A similar performance is found in the age group 
7-8. Both the children aged 5-6 and those of 7-8 years present a performance 
significantly different from the group aged 3-4. 
Results for Relief are also in line with those obtained by Weisberg and 
Beck (2010). We recorded the emotion of relief for the 7-8 year group only. The 
average score for relief of the group aged 7-8 were significantly different from the 
group aged 3-4 and 5-6. There were no significant differences between the means 
of the group aged 3-4 and 5-6. The study provides evidences for a lag between 
regret and relief, according Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) results.  
The lag between regret (at 5years old) and relief (at 7 years old) it is not 
clearly explained and would needs further investigation. We believe that it would 
be important to increase the salience for both the negative and for the positive 
outcomes, in order to investigate if children could understand regret before the 
age of 5, as Weisberg and Beck (2010) and Amsel and Smalley (2000), and relief 
before the age of 7 (Weisberg and Beck, 2010). We thus introduced the use of 
some avatars and children were asked to choose one of them to represent 
themselves in the game. They are important to underlie what happened after the 
choice of the child and what could have happened if child had chosen another 
box, as described in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.  
Another important point is the responsibility for the outcome. Less 
responsibility for the outcome has been shown to reduce feelings of regret (e.g. 
Burks, 1946; Byrne, 2002; Markman & Tetlock, 2000; Roese and Olson, 1995a; 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk & Manstead, 1998; Zeelenberg, van Dijk & Manstead, 
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2000). In another study results indicated that there was a strong positive 
correlation between regret and responsibility for the outcome (Zeelenberg et al. 
1998). 
We ran two experiments in order to investigate how a change in 
methodology can provide for different results from previous studies. Our study 
was approved by the ethic committee of the University of Trento. Parents of all 
participants gave their informed consent. Children were normally developing and 
of the same socioeconomic status. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
 
The experiment in this chapter is part of the paper named: 
 
Guerini, R., Coricelli, G. (in preparation). Regret and Relief in 3- to 10-year-old 
Children: The Ontogenesis of Counterfactual Emotions and the «Agency Effect». 
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3. STUDY II: REGRET AND RELIEF IN 3- TO 10-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN 
 
Experiment II 
 
Introduction 
 
In Experiment I we replicated Weisberg and Beck’s results. We ran 
Experiment II with some methodological changes. 
Previous studies investigating the development of regret and relief (Amsel 
et al. 2000, 2003; Beck et al. 2010) employed a first and a second emotional 
evaluation. In Amsel et al.’s first studies (2000) participants were involved in a 
game in which they had to rate the happiness of an agent and in their last 
experiments they played for themselves in a card game against the experimenter. 
Participants were asked to rate the happiness of the agents (or their happiness 
when played for themselves) on a 4-point scale with 4 smileys representing the 
following emotions: “not at all happy”, “a little happy”, “pretty happy” or “very 
happy”. After the presentation of the scale, followed by the choice of the box and 
the revealing of the outcome, they were asked the first question: “How happy is 
(name of the doll) with the gift received?”. So the alternative outcome was 
revealed and they were asked to report how happy is the doll again. Authors 
examined the differences in the answers to the initial question and the 
counterfactual question in order to test whether the participants gave different 
judgments before and after discovering the contents of the not chosen box.  
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In another experiment Amsel et al. (2003) introduced a new question. 
After revealing the selected card, questions became three. The initial one: “How 
do you feel / how does Billie feel after turning the card?”. The counterfactual 
question after shooting the not selected card: “Who would win the sticker if you / 
Billie chose this card and not the one you / Billie selected? Billie, you or 
nobody?”. And the final question, asked after covering the not selected card: “Do 
you remember you said that you was / Billie were / happy / sad after shooting the 
card? Now you/Billie saw the not selected card. How do you feel about your / his 
choice? Do you feel / Does Billie feel happier /sadder than before, less happy /sad 
or the same? According to their results, the recognition of the two counterfactual 
emotions is not possible before 5-6 years old. Data also show a simultaneous 
emergence of the ability to attribute counterfactual emotions to self and others. 
Also Weisberg and Beck (2010) investigated regret and relief with a first 
and a second emotional evaluation in a task in which children had to choice 
between two boxes. Children were asked to rate their emotions (first evaluation) 
after the opening of the chosen box and to rate their emotions again (second 
evaluation) after the opening of the unchosen box.  
Authors subtracted the initial score (baseline) from the final score, in order 
to have a score difference between -4 and +4. The scores below zero indicated 
that participants were less happy for the choice of the box after seeing the contents 
of the alternative box (the one not chosen). This indicated regret. Scores above 
zero indicated instead relief. They reported that regret emerges at five years old 
while relief at seven. 
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Weisberg and Beck (2011) employed the two emotional evaluations again 
but also three arrows pointing up, left or right in order to rate for the second 
emotional evaluation scores like “even sadder” (pointing left), “even happier” 
(pointing right), “the same” (pointing up). Children were also provided with 
feedbacks based on the correct or incorrect responses in the training procedure. In 
this second experiment both regret and relief are emotions that children are able to 
experience starting at 5-6 years old. 
O’Connor et al. (2012) introduced two methodological changes to 
Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) experiment. They introduced a baseline in order to 
measure the understanding of regret avoiding a first and a second evaluation after 
the choice and they used the three arrows employed by Weisberg and Beck’s 
(2011) experiment. The baseline aimed to rate their emotions after the choice 
comparing it with a same outcome as a counterfactual prize. They found evidence 
for regret in the age group of 6-7 years old and 8-9. Both these age groups were 
also able to explain their change in feelings because of the greater desirability of 
the counterfactual outcome. They obtained an increase of the reported 
counterfactual children for trials in which participants received the baseline first.  
 In a second experiment they still used the baseline, because of the results 
of the experiment one and they introduced three arrows as Weisberg and Beck 
(2011) did, in order to ask children to evaluate their emotions as even sadder, even 
happier of the same. All children received the baseline trial first.   Children were 
able to feel regret starting at 6 years old.  
In Rafetsder and Perner’s (2012) experiments participants were presented 
with a 8-point smiley faces from very happy to very sad. They were shown two 
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boxes in order to choose one. They tested children’s ratings both presenting the 
question twice (before and after seeing the alternative outcome) and presenting  
the question only one time, after showing the unchosen outcome. Their results are 
that children experience regret starting at 9. 
In my experiment children are provided with a choice without ambiguity: 
they can see the content of the boxes all the time. The boxes are transparent 
instead of the closed boxes used in previous studies. So participants are presented 
with their content immediately and for all the duration of each trial, instead of 
seeing the chosen and the unchosen content after the choice only. I propose a final 
emotional evaluation only, with both the chosen and the unchosen outcome 
simultaneously shown. I also defined two conditions, one defined as partial (and 
it is determined when we provide the outcome of the chosen box only) and one 
defined as complete (when we provide the outcome of both the chosen and the 
unchosen box). According to these definition, the partial condition may elicit  
disappointment and elation while the complete condition may elicit regret and 
relief, as in Camille et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005).  
Children can opt for a safe choice (choosing the box which give the 
opportunity to win something for sure) or for a risky choice (choosing the box 
which gives the opportunity to win a high amount of tokens or nothing).  
 
Method 
Participants 
 
We tested 209 participants aged 3 to 10 (116 boys, 93 girls) (mean age = 7 years, 
6 months; range from 3 years, 0 months to 10 years, 11 months).  
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Children were divided in four age groups: 3-5 year-old (n = 76, 38 male 
and 38 female; M = 5 years, 2 months; range = 3 years, 0 month to 5 years, 10 
months); 6-7 year-old (n = 90, 44  male and 46 female; M = 6 years, 6 months; 
range = 6 years, 0 months to  7 years, 11 months); 8-9 year-old (n = 94, 46 male 
and 48 female; M = 8 years, 6 months; range = 8 years, 0 months to 9 years, 11 
months); 10 year-old (n = 56, 28 male and 28 female; M = 10 years, 4 months, 
range = 10 years, 0 months to 10 years, 11 months).  
Each child was tested in a quiet room in the kindergarten or in the school 
for a session of twenty minutes. From the initial sample of 213 children three 
children aged 4 were excluded because they failed the emotional evaluation 
training and one child aged 3 was excluded because he failed the training session. 
Materials 
 
Training Phase. All participants were involved in an emotional evaluation 
training before the task in order to test their comprehension of the five point 
Likert scale used in the study. Each participant was asked to point the very sad 
face, the very happy face, the sad face, the happy face and the neutral face (not 
happy or sad) in a random order. Children who were not able to point one of the 
five faces or who was wrong after three times and the experimenter explanation 
were excluded from the sample.  
The emotional evaluation training was followed by an explanation of the task and 
a training session. Who failed the training session was excluded from the sample. 
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Procedure  
 
Children were presented two transparent boxes, each divided into two 
parts, tokens and smileys (see fig. 3.1). They were explained they could win 
tokens to change for stickers at the end of the game. They were presented the PC 
and eight avatars. Each child was asked to choose an avatar to represent himself in 
the game and a rival avatar (see fig. 3.2 e fig. 3.3).  
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Boxes, PC, smileys and tokens 
 
 
                            
            Fig. 3.2 Avatars                                                       Fig. 3.3 Choice of the avatars  
 
Test Phase 
The experimenter put in the boxes each token one by one. Child was said 
to choose one of the boxes and to put his/her avatar in front of the chosen box (not 
in the left or in the right part but in the middle). The child was provided with two 
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types of choices: the «safe choice» (e.g. containing three tokens in the left side of 
the box and five tokens in the right side) and the «risky choice» (containing many 
tokens to win or zero, e.g. containing eight tokens in the right side of the box and 
zero tokens in the left).  
The PC was placed in front of the two boxes. It was a PC laptop with the 
possibility to turn the screen and fold it up to make it stick to the keyboard. So 
children were presented with a surface that had not even the appearance of a PC. 
It represented two wheels in order to place the left wheel in front of the left box 
and the right wheel in front of the right box. After the child’s choice a square 
appeared around the left or the right wheel according to the choice made, a 
spinning arrow started spinning for few seconds, and then stop pointing to the 
right or the left side of the box. Thus indicating if the child won the right or the 
left side of the chosen box (see fig. 3.4 and fig. 3.5). 
 
                                       
Fig. 3.4 left wheel pointing right                                              Fig. 3.5 left wheel pointing left 
 
In the complete feedback condition, we provided the outcome of the 
chosen and unchosen boxes. Indeed, two spinning arrows appeared inside each 
wheel (chosen surrounded by a square, and the unchosen), they were spinning for 
few seconds, then they stop simultaneously, indicating the obtained outcome of 
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the chosen box and the outcome that they could have obtained if the child had 
chosen the other box (see fig. 3.6 and fig. 3.7). 
 
                
 
Fig. 3.6 arrows pointing to the outcomes  
of the chosen box and the unchosen one  
           (child’s choice: left box) 
Fig. 3.7 arrows pointing to the outcomes  
of the chosen box and the unchosen one  
           (child’s choice: right box) 
 
 
 
According to the condition (partial or complete) the child avatar and the 
rival avatar were placed in front of the boxes. In disappointment and elation trials 
(partial condition) the child avatar was moved from the middle of the box (where 
the child placed it after the choice) (see fig. 3.8) to the left or the right part of the 
box (according to the outcome of the arrow) and the rival avatar in the opposite 
side of the same box (see fig. 3.9).  
 
                                                 
Fig. 3.8 Child avatar, boxes, PC                                             Fig. 3.9 Child avatar and rival  
avatar in front of the chosen box,    
indicating the obtained and the 
unobtained outcome 
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In regret and relief trials (complete condition) the child avatar was moved 
from the middle of the box (where the child placed it after the choice) (see fig. 
3.10) to the left or the right part of the box (according to the outcome of the 
arrow) and the rival avatar in front of the side of the unchosen box, according to 
the side pointed by the arrow of the other wheel (see fig. 3.11).  
 
                                           
 
Fig. 3.10 Child avatar and rival  
avatar in front of the boxes                         
     Fig. 3.11 Chosen avatar on the left side 
     of the left box and rival avatar 
     on the right side of the right box 
 
Four trials were run both for the partial condition (two trials for 
disappointment and two trials for elation) and for the complete condition (two 
trials for regret and two trials for relief). Each condition was preceded by a 
familiarization trial.  
Participants were asked to rate for each trial how they felt on the 5-point 
scale (see fig. 3.12). The experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular 
outcome was following the participant choice and that «the alternative choice 
could have been his/her outcome but he/she didn’t choose that box».  
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 Fig. 3.12 Emotional evaluation 
 
Each condition was presented to participants in counterbalanced order: 
“disappointment/elation condition” followed by “regret/relief condition” for half 
participant and “regret/relief condition” followed by “disappointment/elation 
condition” for the other half.   
 
Results and discussion 
 
Participants received a score ranging from -2 to +2 depending on their emotional 
rating. The answer named “very sad” was coded as “-2”, the answer named “sad” 
as “-1”, the “not happy or sad” as “0”, the “happy” answer as “1” and the “very 
happy” as “2”.  
 In our experimental setting, we considered the effect of the counterfactual 
outcome (i.e., the unobtained outcome in the partial feedback and the outcome of 
the unchosen option in the complete feedback) on the evaluation of the obtained 
outcome, as the difference between elation and disappointment and relief and 
regret, in the partial and complete condition respectively. Additionally, we 
considered a more restrictive definition of regret effect, defined as the differential 
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evaluation (i.e. amplification effect) between upward counterfactual in the partial 
(disappointment) vs. complete condition (regret). 
We ran a 4 (Age group: 3-5; 6-7; 8-9; 10) x 4 (Task: Disappointment; 
Elation; Regret; Relief) analysis of variance (ANOVA). We obtained a main 
effect of Task, F(3, 204) = 106.93 p < .001, partial 
2 
= . 343 and a significant 
interaction between Task and  Age group, F(9, 204) = 14.12 p < .001, partial 
2 
= 
.172. Mean emotional evaluation for the different emotions are shown in fig. 3.13. 
 
 
Fig. 3.13 Mean scores of each age group 
 
For disappointment and elation trials (partial feedback) post hoc Tukey’s 
HSD tests showed a significant difference between disappointment and elation for 
the age group of 6-7 year-old (p < .001), for the age group of 8-9 year-old (p < 
.001) and for the age group of 10 year-old (p < .001). No significant differences 
were found for the age group of 3-5 year-old (see fig. 3.14). 
For regret and relief trials (complete feedback) post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests 
showed a significant difference between regret and relief trials for the age group 
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of 6-7 year-old (p < .001), for the age group of 8-9 year-old (p < .001) and for the 
age group of 10 year-old (p < .001). No significant differences were found for the 
age group of 3-5 year-old (see fig. 3.15).  
 
 
Fig. 3.14  Mean scores for age groups in the partial feedback condition 
 
 
Fig. 3.15  Mean scores for age groups in the complete feedback condition 
 
No significant differences were found for disappointment or for elation 
scores between age groups. There was a significant difference for regret scores for 
the age group of 6-7 compared with the age group of 3-5 (p <.001), for the age 
group of 8-9 compared with the age group of 3-5 (p < .001) and for the age group 
-2
-1
0
1
2
Age Group 3-5 Age Group 6-7 Age Group 8-9 Age Group 10
EM
O
TI
O
N
A
L 
EV
A
LU
A
TI
O
N
 
Partial Feedback Condition 
DISAPPOINTMENT
ELATION
*** 
*** 
*** p <.001 
*** 
-2
-1
0
1
2
Age Group 3-5 Age Group 6-7 Age Group 8-9 Age Group 10
EM
O
TI
O
N
A
L 
EV
A
LU
A
TI
O
N
 
Complete Feedback Condition 
REGRET
RELIEF
*** p <.001 
63 
 
of 10 compared with the age group of 3-5 (p <.001). For relief scores there was a 
significant difference between the age group of 8-9 compared with the age group 
of 6-7 (p <.001).  
In the range of 3-5 years old children demonstrate to not understand 
disappointment and regret. They do understand the game but they are not able to 
compare what happened with what would have happened, both when they are 
responsible for the outcome and when they are not. This evidence is also 
supported by children verbal’s reports.  
In order to compare differences for each single age instead of groups, we 
ran a second Analysis of Variance comparing all ages. We performed a 8 (Age) x 
4 (Task) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). We obtained a main effect of Task, F(3, 
200) = 99.23 p < .001, partial 
2 
= . 331 and an interaction between Task and Age, 
F(21, 200) = 7.10 p < .001, partial 
2 
= .199. Means are shown in fig. 3.16. 
 
 
                                Fig. 3.16 Mean Scores for each age 
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For disappointment and elation trials (partial feedback) post hoc Tukey’s 
HSD tests showed a significant difference between disappointment and elation 
starting from the age of 7 year-old (see fig. 3.17). For regret and relief trials 
(complete feedback) post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests showed a significant difference 
between regret and relief starting from the age of 7 year-old (see fig. 3.18).  
Starting from 6 year-old children reported the evaluation of 
disappointment with a score below zero, but this difference compared with elation 
it’s not significant. At the same age they started to report regret below the score of 
zero and the difference with relief is significant at 10% level (p = .06).  
 
   
          Fig. 3.17 Mean scores for each age in partial feedback trials 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
EM
O
TI
O
N
A
L 
EV
A
LU
A
TI
O
N
 
AGE 
PARTIAL FEEDBACK DISAPPOINTMENT
ELATION
  
***  p < .001  
 
      *** 
          *** 
         *** 
*** 
65 
 
   
            Fig. 3.18 Mean scores for each age in complete feedback trials 
     
 
We also wanted to test whether scores for each age deviated from zero 
using one-sample t tests. A significant positive result provided evidences for relief 
and a significant negative result provided evidences for regret. 
The first evidence for relief was at 6, t(25) = 7.49, p < .001. At the same age 
we found the first evidence for elation, t(25) = 7.64, p < .001. The first evidence for 
regret was at 9, t(25) = - 2.88, p < .001. At the same age we found the first evidence 
for disappointment, t(25) = - 2.74, p < .01. 
No significant differences were found between disappointment and regret 
before the age of 9, t(25) = - 2.88, p <.001. We found a significant difference 
between elation and relief started from the age of 6, t(25) = 7.49, p < .001. 
Both regret and relief are reported by children starting from the age of 6. If 
we examine the effect of the counterfactual outcome on the evaluation of the 
obtained outcome as the difference between elation and disappointment and relief 
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and regret, we could conclude that regret and relief are both emotions experienced 
starting at 7. If we consider a more restrictive definition, defined as the differential 
evaluation between upward counterfactual in the partial (disappointment) vs. 
complete condition (regret), we have to conclude with the idea of a lag between 
the two emotions, with relief experienced before regret. Indeed we found a 
significant difference between regret and disappointment starting at 9, so we have 
to conclude for a first evidence of regret in children at the age of 9, as in 
Rafetseder & Perner (2012) experiment.  
Considering a more restrictive definition also for relief, defined as the 
differential evaluation between downward counterfactual in the partial (elation) 
vs. complete condition (relief) we found significant differences between the two 
conditions starting at 6. 
In our study children scored lower in reporting negative counterfactual 
emotions than the positive ones. This may be due to the more important role that  
negative counterfactual emotions play in adaptive behavior. For the emotion of 
regret implies an assumption of responsibility for one’s own actions and the 
consequent necessity to learn from the past and behave in a different way in the 
future. All this implies more commitment, as well as more sophisticated cognitive 
abilities than those involved in being relieved for one’s own actions.    
In order to investigate the role of the responsibility for the outcome with a 
manipulation of participants’ sense and judgment of agency, we ran study 3. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 3 
 
 
The experiment in this chapter is part of the paper named: 
 
Guerini, R., Coricelli, G. (in preparation). Regret and Relief in 3- to 10-year-old 
Children: The Ontogenesis of Counterfactual Emotions and the «Agency Effect». 
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4. STUDY III: THE ROLE OF SENSE OF AGENCY ON 
COUNTERFACTUAL EMOTIONS 
 
Experiment III 
 
Introduction 
 
In our everyday experience of our voluntary actions we have a certain 
phenomenal experience of mineness of these actions. E.g., when reaching for a 
cup, I know this to be my action. This experience, however, involves at least two 
fundamentally different aspects of minimal action-related self-awareness, which - 
in this case - coincide and are phenomenally indistinguishable: the sense of 
agency (SoA), i.e. the realization that I am the initiator of my reaching for a cup 
(rather than somebody or something else); a sense of body ownership (SoO), i.e. 
the registration that my arm which is reaching for a cup belongs to me (rather than 
belonging to somebody or something else). 
SoO and SoA are analog in their formal representational structure in that 
each of them can be framed in a comprehensive multi-level framework outlined 
by Synofzik et al. (2008). This framework gradually increases in representational 
and functional complexity and proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor 
representations to full-blown conceptual representations of agency and ownership, 
respectively. Each level of the SoA and the SoO, respectively, can be individuated 
by means of the following individuation criteria:  
 
(i) its form of representation;  
(ii) the cognitive capacity it makes use of;  
(iii) the underlying neurocognitive process; 
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(iv) its differential break-down in certain neurological or  
psychopathological circumstances.  
 
By means of these criteria one can identify at least four systematic levels of the 
SoA and the SoO, respectively: 
 
 
  Source: Synofzik et al. (2008). 
 
 
 
Sense of Agency 
 
Sensory registration of action-effect-couplings. In order to experience 
oneself as the initiator of one’s own actions, it is a very basic prerequisite that a 
system learns to systematically register a certain sensory event as the typical 
effect of its own actions.  
Feeling of agency. If the action-effect-registration is systematically used by 
the cognitive system to establish a stable representation of an action as self-
produced, then the non-conceptual feeling of being the agent is produced. What is 
learned on this level is to establish a stable perception-based representation of the 
effect of one’s own action as the effect of one’s own action. 
The feeling of agency is produced by a gradual and highly plastic 
subpersonal weighting process of different action-related perceptual and motor 
cues, which are partly afferent (visual feedback, proprioception) and partly 
efferent (action prediction, body schema). One of the most important sensorimotor 
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cues for the feeling of agency is provided by the so-called “comparator system”. 
According to a well-established model of normal action control, when the brain 
executes a motor plan, an “efference copy” of each set of motor instructions is 
transformed via one or more body emulator systems and used to construct a 
“forward model” of the expected sensory consequences of the action. This can 
then be compared both with the motor intention itself and with the incoming 
perceptual data, allowing for swift correction of the action as it unfolds (e.g. 
Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). The idea is then that a 
congruency between predicted and actual state may be used by the cognitive 
system to register a sensory event as caused by oneself, while an incongruence 
may lead to the registration of a sensory event as externally caused. 
Judgment of agency. if the non-conceptual feeling of agency is further 
processed by the cognitive system by additionally involving conceptual capacities 
and belief stances, then a conceptual, interpretative judgment of being the agent is 
produced. What is learned on this level is to conceptually represent the effect of 
one’s own action as the effect of one’s own action. The judgment of agency is 
formed by a rationalization process that normally has a feeling of agency as input. 
Thus, the judgment of agency normally starts with the output of the weighting of 
sensorimotor authorship indicators (e.g. the comparator output) and then proceeds 
with ad hoc theorizing and belief formation about oneself, which is produced by a 
weighting of cognitive authorship indicators (e.g. contextual cues, belief states, 
etc.). But the judgment of agency does not necessarily presuppose a feeling of 
agency. The rationalization process has multiple inputs such that it works even if 
the feeling of agency input signal is missing. 
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Ascription of moral responsibility. If a cognitive system cannot only form 
agency beliefs and judgments, i.e. attribute a certain action to a certain author (in 
the sense of being the cause), but also reliably register the mental state preceding 
the action – viz. the intentional action planning –, it is capable of ascribing moral 
responsibility. 
 To our knowledge, the only study manipulating the responsibility for the 
outcome in relation to counterfactual emotions was Weisberg and Beck (2011) 
study. The responsibility for the outcome has much in common according to us  
with a sense of feeling to be the author of one’s actions and also to judge the 
outcome of one’s action rating own consequent feelings. 
Weisberg and Beck (2011) designed an experiment in which children were 
presented with three conditions. The experiment was a between subject design. 
The first condition, named “choice”, represents a replication of the experiment 
one, in which children chose one of two cards to turn over. The second condition 
is  named “no choice-experimenter”. The experimenter rolls one dice in order to 
determine the participant’s card. In the third condition, named “no choice-child”, 
the participant rolls a dice which determines his/her card.  Their results report that 
in no choice conditions participants are less likely to experience regret and relief.  
 In order to test whether our methodology provide for different results and 
to investigate the role of something that is not an animate agent as in Weisberg 
and Beck’s (2011) experiment, we ran experiment III. We used a PC in the role of 
an inanimate agent providing a choice and a subsequent outcome for our 
participants. 
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Method 
Participants 
 
We tested 225 participants aged 3 to 10 (109 boys, 116 girls). Children were 
divided in four age groups: 3-5 year-old (n = 89, 44 male and 45 female; M = 4 
years, 2 months, range = 3 years, 0 months to 5 years, 10 months); 6-7 year-old (n 
= 50, 22 male and 28 female; M = 6 years, 8 months; range = 6 years, 0 months to 
7 years, 11 months); 8-9 year-old (n = 56, 28 male and 28 female; M = 8 years, 10 
months; range = 8 years, 0 months to 9 years, 11 months); 10 year-old (n = 30, 15 
male and 15 female; M = 10 years, 2 months; range = 10 years, 0 months to 10 
years, 11 months). 
Each child was tested in a quiet room in the kindergarten or in the school 
for a session of twenty minutes. No child failed the emotional evaluation training 
or the training session. 
 
Procedure 
 
Training Phase. As in experiment II, all participants were involved in an 
emotional evaluation training before the task in order to test their comprehension 
of the five point Likert scale used in the study. Each participant was asked to point 
the very sad face, the very happy face, the sad face, the happy face and the neutral 
face (not happy or sad) in a random order. Children who were not able to point 
one of the five faces or who was wrong after three times and the experimenter 
explanation were excluded from the sample.  
The emotional evaluation training was followed by an explanation of the task and 
a training session. Who failed the training session was excluded from the sample. 
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Materials  
 
Children were presented with the same boxes as in the experiment two. 
They were explained they could win tokens to change for stickers at the end of the 
game. They were presented the PC and eight avatars. Each child was explained, as 
in the previous study, to choose an avatar to represent himself/herself in the game 
and a rival avatar. All children were tested both in the agency condition and in the 
no agency condition, presented to participant in a counterbalanced order.   
 
Agency Condition 
 
For the Agency Condition the test phase was the same as in experiment II, 
with the experimenter putting in the boxes each token one by one. So the child  
chose one of the boxes and put his avatar in front of it (not in the left or in the 
right part but in the middle). Then the wheel of the PC, pointing left or right, 
decided among the chosen box the outcome and for regret and relief condition 
both the outcome inside the chosen box and the outcome child didn’t get because 
he didn’t choose that box. 
Participants were asked to rate for each trial how the feel on the 5-point 
scale. The experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was 
following the participant choice and that «the alternative choice could have been 
his/her outcome but he/she didn’t choose that box».  
 
No agency condition  
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In the no agency condition each child was presented with the same materials but 
the PC was provided with a little wheel placed below the two wheels (see fig. 4.1) 
in front of the boxes. 
  
 
Fig. 4.1 PC for the no agency condition 
 
It was explained to the children that the choice was made by the PC. The 
choice of the computer was indicated by the direction of an arrow in a small 
wheel placed on the bottom of the screen. The arrow inside the little wheel spins 
for few seconds, and then it stops, indicating the selected (big) wheel, thus the 
selected chosen box. A square appears around the wheel (see fig. 4.2). 
       
           Fig. 4.2 choice made by the PC 
 
A few seconds later the wheel chosen by the PC starts spinning, and then it stops 
pointing left or right portion of the chosen box, thus the obtained outcome (see fig. 
4.3). 
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                                  Fig. 4.3 No-agency partial feedback condition. The arrow indicates  
                                  that the obtained outcome is the outcome on the left of the box  
                    selected by the computer. 
 
 
The same procedure was followed in a no-agency complete condition. The 
experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was following the 
computer’s choice and that «the alternative choice could have been his/her 
outcome but the computer didn’t choose that box».  
Participants were asked to rate for each trial how they felt according to the 
computer’s choice and their following outcome. The two different conditions, 
Agency and No Agency, were run in a counterbalanced order. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
As in Experiment 2, participants received a score ranging from -2 to +2 depending 
on their emotional rating. The answer named “very sad” was coded as “-2”, the 
answer named “sad” as “-1”, the “not happy or sad” as “0”, the “happy” answer as 
“1” and the “very happy” as “2”.  
We performed a 4 (Age: 3-5; 6-7; 8-9; 10) x 4 (Trial Type: 
Disappointment, Elation, Regret, Relief) x 2 (Condition: Agency; No agency) 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed a 
main effect for Trial Type, F(3, 221) = 379.52, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .631. There was 
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a significant interaction between Trial Type and Age Group, F(9, 221) = 22.41, p < 
.001, partial 2 = .233; a significant interaction between Trial Type and Condition, 
F(3, 221) = 60.15, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .214; and a significant three-way interaction 
between Trial Type, Condition and Age Group, F(9, 221) = 7.59, p < .001, partial 
2
 
= .093. We conducted Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests in order to test the significant 
interactions. Means are shown in fig. 4.4 and fig. 4.5. 
 
 
         Fig. 4.4 Comparison of Agency and No Agency conditions for partial feedback trials  
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The comparison between Agency Regret and No Agency Regret provides 
us with significant differences for the age group of 6-7 (p <.001), for the age 
group of 8-9 (p <.001) and for the age group of 10 (p <.001) (see fig. 4.5 and fig. 
4.6).  
 
 
   Fig. 4.6 Comparison of Agency and No Agency conditions for Regret trials 
 
No significant differences were found for the age group of 3-5, supporting 
the idea that this negative counterfactual emotions is experienced and reported 
only starting from the age of 6-7. We didn’t find any significant differences for 
any of the Age Groups comparing the conditions of Agency Disappointment and 
No Agency Disappointment (see fig. 4.4), supporting the idea of a difference 
between the emotions of Disappointment and Regret.     
No significant differences between groups were found for Elation trials 
comparing the Agency with the No Agency conditions (see fig. 4.4). A significant 
difference was found only for the age group of 10 (p <.001) comparing the 
Agency and the No Agency conditions for Relief trials (fig. 4.5 and fig.4.7).     
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    Fig. 4.7 Comparison of Agency and No Agency conditions for Relief trials 
 
 
In Agency Condition we replicated results of experiment 2, finding significant 
differences between disappointment and elation trials and regret and relief trials 
for the age group of 6-7 year-old (p < .001), 8-9 year-old (p < .001), 10 (p < .001) 
and no significant differences for the age group of 3-5 year-old (see fig. 4.8).  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 Emotional evaluation for all the age groups in Agency Condition 
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Consistently with experiment 2, we also found a significant difference between 
elation and relief started at 6, (t(30) = 16.37, p <.001) and a significant difference 
between disappointment and regret starting at 9 (t(28) = - 4.81, p <.001).  
Also in this experiment in the range of 3-5 years old children demonstrate 
to not understand disappointment and regret. They do understand the game but 
they are not able to compare what happened with what would have happened, 
both when they are responsible for the outcome and when they are not. This 
evidence is also supported by the non- significant differences between no agency 
and agency conditions and by children verbal’s reports.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 4 
 
 
The experiment in this chapter is part of the paper named: 
 
Guerini, R. e Coricelli, G. (in preparation). Social comparison and self/other 
attribution of counterfactual emotions. 
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5. STUDY IV: SELF AND OTHER-ATTRIBUTION OF 
COUNTERFACTUAL EMOTIONS IN A SAMPLE OF 3- TO 10 
YEAR-OLD CHILDREN 
 
Introduction 
 
Previous studies investigating self- and other- attribution of counterfactual 
emotions reported contrasting results.  
In Amsel et al. (2003) study in Self conditions the experimenter introduced 
two dolls representing two agents of the same sex of the participants. Close to the 
dolls were placed two boxes. Participants were said to be gift boxes. They 
contained a plastic figurine for children and $ 5 for adults. The evaluation of the 
agent’s happiness in relation to the choice consisted of a 4-point scale represented 
by 4 smileys: not at all happy, a little happy, pretty happy or very happy. After the 
presentation of the scale they were asked the first question: “How happy is (name 
of the doll) with the gift received?”. So the alternative outcome was revealed and 
they were asked to report how happy is the doll again. The participants were 
randomly assigned to two conditions. One was the condition with the alternative 
outcome as a better gift than received and the other one was the condition with a 
worse alternative outcome compared with the gift received. The evaluation of the 
feelings of the agent was asked after revealing the content of the not chosen box 
and the counterfactual question was asked: “How much would have been happy 
(name of) if he/she had chosen the other box?”. This was followed by a final 
question: “How happy is now (name of) with the gift received?”. It would be a 
repetition of the initial question, but after knowing the alternatives. 
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The authors examined the answers’ differences between the initial 
question and the counterfactual question in order to examine whether the 
participants gave different judgments before and after discovering the contents of 
the not chosen box. Their results revealed a significant effect of the alternative 
outcome: if positive, the main character was judged happier than the protagonist 
getting a negative alternative result, all in relation to the given answers in 
response to the counterfactual question compared to the original question. This 
effect was seen in all the age groups. 
The qualitative analysis suggested to authors that pre-school children as 
well as adults judge the feelings of the protagonist on possible states of things. A 
second analysis assesses the differences in the initial and final answer to the 
question, and so the judgments about the feelings of the protagonists in relation to 
the fact that it was revealed the contents of the not selected box. Through the 
results of this study they assumed that young children represent themselves and 
think like adults with regard to the feelings of the protagonists in relation to states 
of things that could have happened. Counterfactual thinking, therefore, is thought 
to be possessed even by very young children. 
Other researchers have also become interested in the emergence of 
counterfactual thinking in preschool children, claiming that the visible change at 
4/5 years regarding the counterfactual reasoning is due to several factors: an 
increase in the mental capacity of children to represent explicitly and reason about 
real alternatives, the acquisition of the ability to imagine alternatives to reality 
than those involving only negative outcomes, the acquisition of the ability to think 
about alternative states of things. 
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The idea to test is the possibility that children think about an alternative 
world but not in connection with the real one and that they actually give a 
judgment on the amount of gift received instead of reporting a counterfactual 
emotion. In order to test this hypothesis, Amsel et al. (2003) ran another 
experiment, with the presence of details about the agent. 
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) designed three experiments in order to test 
the understanding of regret and relief in children. Participants were asked to make 
decisions with respect to the emotional responses of some agents. The focus of the 
study was therefore on understanding children’s emotional responses of others 
rather than to focus on their own emotions. As a dependent variable a measure 
similar to the Counterfactual Inference Test (Hooker, Roese and Park, 2000) was 
used. Participants were presented a few stories describing the experience of two 
characters who get some results after the decisions made. The stories always 
contained an element that differentiated the two characters, which was relevant for 
judging regret and relief. The task of the participants was to judge whether the 
characters in the story would have felt in the same way with respect to the results 
obtained, or if one or the other would feel better or worse. 
While Amsel et al. (2003) measured if the intensity of an emotional 
response varies when a participant finds out what might have happened if he had 
made a different choice, in this study Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) simply 
measured if children were able to judge a protagonist in a different way than 
another.  
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Previous researches have suggested that for children such comparisons are 
easy to make, and tasks relating to such judgments are useful as sensitive 
measures of children’s emotions understanding. 
Finally, in the study of Weisberg and Beck (2010) they introduced a 
pinguin playing the game.  
Participants were explicitly presented with the following description 
before opening the alternative box: «Arnold does not win what is inside this (the 
alternative) box». They found that children were able to attribute counterfactual 
emotions to themselves before attributing to others. In their experiment children 
were able to attribute counterfactual emotions to self and to others starting at 7. 
In order to test the self- and hetero- attribution of counterfactual emotions 
employing our new methodology and the relationship between counterfactual 
emotions and social comparison, we ran an experiment with children aged 3 to 10 
and a second experiment with children aged 3 to 11. 
Our study was approved by the ethic committee of the University of 
Trento. Parents of all participants gave their informed consent. Children were 
normally developing and of the same socioeconomic status. 
 
Experiment I 
Method 
Participants 
 
We tested 211 participants aged 3 to 10 (105 boys, 106 girls). Children were 
divided in four age groups: 3-5 year-old (n = 67, 35 male and 32 female; M = 4 
years, 4 months; range = 3 years, 0 months to 5 years, 11 months); 6-7 year-old (n 
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= 56, 26 male and 30 female; M = 6 years, 7 months; range = 6 years, 0 months to 
7 years, 11 months); 8-9 year-old (n = 60, 30 male and 30 female; M = 8 years, 5 
months; range = 8 years, 0 months to 9 years, 11 months); 10 year-old (n = 28, 14 
male and 14 female; M = 10 years, 3 months; range = 10 years, 0 months  to 10 
years, 11 months).  
Each child was tested in a quiet room in the kindergarten or in the school 
for a session of twenty minutes. From the initial sample of 215 children four 
children aged 3 were excluded because he failed the training session. 
Procedure 
 
Training Phase. All participants were involved in an emotional evaluation 
training before the task in order to test their comprehension of the five point 
Likert scale used in the study. Each participant was asked to point the very sad 
face, the very happy face, the sad face, the happy face and the neutral face (not 
happy or sad) in a random order. Children who were not able to point one of the 
five faces or who was wrong after three times and the experimenter explanation 
were excluded from the sample.  
The emotional evaluation training was followed by an explanation of the 
task and a training session. Who failed the training session was excluded from the 
sample. 
Materials  
 
Children were presented two transparent boxes, each divided into two 
parts, tokens and stickers (see fig. 5.1). They were explained they could win 
tokens to change for stickers at the end of the game. They were presented the PC 
and eight avatars. Each child was explained to choose an avatar to represent 
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himself in the game and a rival avatar. The two different conditions, Self and 
Other, were run in a counterbalanced order. 
 
 
                Fig. 5.1 Boxes, PC, smileys and tokens 
 
«Self» Condition 
The experimenter put in the boxes each token one by one. Child was said 
to choose one of the boxes and to put his avatar in front of the chosen box (not in 
the left or in the right part but in the middle). The child was provided with two 
types of choices: the «safe choice» (one box containing something to win for sure 
even if not much, e.g. containing three tokens in the left side of the box and five 
tokens in the right side) and the «risky choice» (containing many tokens to win or 
zero, e.g. containing eight tokens in the right side of the box and zero tokens in 
the left).  
Immediately facing the two boxes was placed the PC. It was a PC laptop 
with the possibility to turn the screen and fold it up to make it stick to the 
keyboard. So children were presented with a surface that had not even the 
appearance of a PC. It represented two wheels in order to place the left wheel in 
front of the left box and the right wheel in front of the right box. After the child’s 
choice a square appeared around the left or the right wheel according to the choice 
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made and a spinning of the wheel’s arrow decided if the child won the right or the 
left side of the box chosen (see fig. 5.2). 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 the laptop with the two wheels 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3 the chosen avatar and the rival avatar placed  
in front of the chosen box (partial condition) 
 
 
According to the condition (partial or complete) the child avatar and the 
rival avatar were placed in front of the boxes. In disappointment and elation trials 
(partial condition)  the child avatar was moved from the middle of the box (where 
the child placed it after the choice) to the left or the right part of the box 
(according to the outcome of the arrow) and the rival avatar in the opposite side of 
the same box (see fig. 5.3). In regret and relief trials (complete condition) the 
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child avatar was moved from the middle of the box (where the child placed it after 
the choice) to the left or the right part of the box (according to the outcome of the 
arrow) and the rival avatar in front of the side of the unchosen box, according to 
the side pointed by the arrow of the other wheel (see fig. 5.4). Four trials were run 
both for the partial condition (two trials for disappointment and two trials for 
elation) both for the complete condition (two trials for regret and two trials for 
relief). Each condition was preceded by a familiarization trial.  
 
                                
                                             Fig. 5.4 complete condition  
 
Participants were asked to rate for each trial how they feel on the 5-point 
scale. The experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was 
following the participant choice and that «the alternative choice could have been 
his/her outcome but he/she didn’t choose that box».  
Each condition was presented to participants in counterbalanced order: 
“disappointment/elation condition” followed by “regret/relief condition” for half 
participant and “regret/relief condition” followed by “disappointment/elation 
condition” for the other half.   
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«Other» Condition 
In the other condition materials and procedure were the same, but in this condition 
the child had only the role of observer (see fig. 5.5) of the game and he/she was 
asked to rate how the experimenter felt about the outcome of his/her choice (see 
fig. 5.6). 
           
Fig. 5.5 The child in the role  
of the observer 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The experimenter playing the  
game and the child as the observer 
 
The experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was 
following the experimenter’s choice and that «the alternative choice could have 
been his/her outcome but he/she didn’t choose that box».  
The child was asking to rate for each trial how the experimenter felt 
according the choice and the outcome. Each condition was presented to 
participants in counterbalanced order: “disappointment/elation condition” 
followed by “regret/relief condition” for half participant and “regret/relief 
condition” followed by “disappointment/elation condition” for the other half.   
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Results and discussion 
 
 
Participants received a score ranging from -2 to +2 depending on their emotional 
rating. The answer named “very sad” was coded as “-2”, the answer named “sad” 
as “-1”, the “not happy or sad” as “0”, the “happy” answer as “1” and the “very 
happy” as “2”.  
We performed a 4 (Age Group: 3-5; 6-7; 8-9; 10) x 4 (Trial Type: 
Disappointment, Elation, Regret, Relief) x 2 (Condition: Self; Other) ANOVA. 
We obtained a main effect for Condition, F(1, 207) = 13.35, p < .001, partial 
2
 = 
.060, a main effect for Trial Type, F(3, 207) = 461.60, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .690, a 
significant interaction for Trial Type and Condition, F(3, 207) = 4.74, p <.001, 
partial 2 = .022 and a significant interaction for Trial Type and Age Group, F(9, 
207) = 22.67, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .247. We conducted Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests 
in order to test the significant interactions. Mean scores are reported in fig. 5.7 and 
fig. 5.8. 
 
 
Fig. 5.7 Mean scores with age groups in partial feedback trials 
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Fig. 5.8 Mean scores with age groups in complete feedback trials 
 
 
 
For Regret trials in Other Condition we obtained significant different 
results between the age group of 3-5 and 6-7 (p < .05), between  the age group of 
3-5 and 8-9 (p <.001), between the age group of 3-5 and 10 (p <.001). No 
significant differences were found between the three groups (see fig. 5.9). 
 
 
Fig. 5.9  Regret trials in Other Condition 
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For Regret trials in Self Condition we obtained a significant difference 
between the age group of 3-5 and 6-7 (p < .05), a significant difference between  
the age group of 3-5 and 8-9 (p <.001), and a significant difference between the 
age group of 3-5 and 10 (p <.05). No significant differences were found between 
the three groups. 
The comparison between  Self Regret and Other Regret provides us with 
significant differences for the age group of 6-7 (p < .05), for the age group of 8-9 
(p <.001) and for the age group of 10 (p <.001) (see fig. 5.10). Children reported a 
more negative evaluation for Regret trials in Other Condition than in Self 
Condition but this difference is significant starting from the age group of 6-7. We 
didn’t consider the difference between the two in the age range 3-5 because of 
children’s positive emotional evaluation instead of negative. 
We didn’t find any significant differences for any of the Age Groups 
comparing the conditions of Self Disappointment and Other Disappointment (see 
fig. 5.7), No significant differences between groups were found for Elation trials 
comparing Self with Other conditions (see fig. 5.7). For Relief Trials in Self and 
Other conditions we found significant differences for the age group of 6-7 only (p 
<.001) (see fig. 5.8 and fig. 5.11).  
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    Fig. 5.10 Means for Regret trials in Self and Other conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
    Fig. 5.11 Means for Relief Trials in Self and Other conditions  
 
 
 
In disappointment and regret trials results show lower scores for Other 
condition than Self condition. In elation and relief trials they performed the same. 
We hypothesize that children found more simple to attribute negative 
counterfactual emotions to the experimenter rather than attributing to themselves. 
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We didn’t find this effect for positive counterfactual emotions: in these trials 
children performed the same in both conditions. 
In order to test the effect of social comparison in reporting counterfactual 
emotions, we ran experiment 2. 
  
95 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 5 
 
 
The experiment in this chapter is part of the paper named: 
 
Guerini, R. e Coricelli, G. (in preparation). Social comparison and self/other 
attribution of counterfactual emotions.  
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6. STUDY V : COUNTERFACTUAL EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL 
COMPARISON IN A SAMPLE OF 3-TO 11 YEAR- OLD 
CHILDREN 
 
Experiment II 
 
Introduction 
 
In our previous experiment we investigated self- and hetero- attribution of 
counterfactual emotions to an animate agent rather than an inanimate agent as in 
previous studies (Amsel et al. 2000; Weisberg & Beck, 2010). Participants 
showed to be able to attribute to others counterfactual emotions as well as to 
themselves starting from 6 years old.  
 The aim of this experiment is to study counterfactual emotions in social 
comparisons’ trials.  
To our knowledge the only study investigating counterfactual emotions 
derived from social comparison in children was Steinbeis & Singer’s (2013) 
study. They tested 182 participants aged from 7 to 13 in a monetary reward and 
punishment task. Children were rewarded or punished in an evaluation of their 
performance based on reaction times. Afterwards, in social condition trials, they 
were provided with feedbacks about competitor’s performances and performances 
of theirs and they were asked to rate how they felt about the outcome. They 
obtained a decrease with age both of Envy and Schadenfreude.  
In our sample children’s age is from 3 year-old. This implicates we are not 
dealing with the emotion of envy until the age of 6-7, but with a social 
comparison between child’s performance and outcome and schoolfellow’s 
performance and outcome. Another important point is our way to name the 
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positive counterfactual emotion. We adopted the word gloating
3
 instead of  
Schadenfreude, because we hypothesize that child is happy for own positive 
outcome compared with his/her schoolfellow’s outcome, instead of being happy 
because of schoolfellow’s negative outcome. This is supported by children’s 
verbal reports.   
Method 
Participants 
 
We tested 242 participants aged 3 to 11 (106 boys, 136 girls) (M = 7 years, 3 
months; range = 3 years, 0 months to 11 years, 11 months).  
Children were divided in four age groups: 3-5 year-old (n = 63, 23 male 
and 40 female; M = 4 years, 3 months; range = 3 years, 0 months to 5 years, 9 
months); 6-7 year-old (n = 59, 29 male and 30 female; M = 6 years, 2 months; 
range = 6 years, 0 months to 7 years, 11 months); 8-9 year-old (n = 57, 27 male 
and 30 female; M = 8 years, 7 months; range = 8 years, 0 months to 9 years, 11 
months); 10-11 year-old (n = 63, 27 male and 36 female; M = 10 years, 3 months; 
range = 10 years, 0 months to 11 years, 11 months). No child failed the emotional 
evaluation training or the training session.  
In this experiment children entered the room in pairs. They were presented 
with materials (the same as the previous experiment) and they were asked to 
choice an avatar. Children were explained the game and they were tested in a 
quiet room in the kindergarten or in the school for a session of twenty minutes.  
                                               
3 Gloating is differentiated from Schadenfreude in that it does not necessarily require malice (one 
may gloat to a friend about having defeated him in a game without ill intent) and that it describes 
an action rather than a state of mind (one typically gloats to the subject of the misfortune or to a 
third party). 
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Procedure 
 
Training Phase. All participants were involved in an emotional evaluation 
training before the task in order to test their comprehension of the five point 
Likert scale used in the study. Each participant was asked to point the very sad 
face, the very happy face, the sad face, the happy face and the neutral face (not 
happy or sad) in a random order. Children who were not able to point one of the 
five faces or who was wrong after three times and the experimenter explanation 
were excluded from the sample.  
The emotional evaluation training was followed by an explanation of the 
task and a training session. Who failed the training session was excluded from the 
sample. 
Materials  
 
Children were presented two transparent boxes, each divided into two 
parts, tokens and stickers, as in the previous study. They were explained they 
could win tokens to change for stickers at the end of the game. They were 
presented the PC and eight avatars. Each child was explained to choose an avatar 
to represent himself in the game and a rival avatar. Different types of trials,  
private or social, were run in a counterbalanced order. For private trials a random 
order was established to decide who played the game alone first.  
 
 
 
Testing Phase 
Private Trials 
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In the private trials each child played the game alone (employing the chosen 
avatar and the rival avatar) while the other child was involved in other activities in 
order to distract him/her from the game played by his/her schoolfellow. 
Each child was provided with a safe choice or a risky choice as in previous 
experiment and with the two boxes in order to choose and play the game. After 
each trial he/she had to rate how she/he felt on the emotional evaluation scale. 
 In this game only trials with complete feedback (only regret or relief trials) 
were run. 
 
 Social trials 
In the social trials children played the game together. Each child had previously 
chosen his/her avatar and was explained that in that game the rival avatar was 
going to be represented by the schoolfellow’s avatar.  
Participants were presented the two boxes, the experimenter inserted 
tokens one by one into them and they were asked to think about their choice for a 
few seconds (see fig.6.1) and to say to the experimenter the word “Done!” when 
they had chosen the box. 
 
 
Fig. 6.1 Social Trials 
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The experimenter asked them to point to the chosen box (see fig. 6.2 and fig. 6.3) 
after a countdown followed by the starting signal (they were also explained they 
can opt for the same box, as they prefer).  
 
 
Fig. 6.2 Choice of different  
boxes in the social trials 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.3 Choice of the same  
box in the social trials 
 
After the choice each avatar was placed in front of the chosen box and the game 
started. In this game only complete feedback trials (envy or gloating trials) were 
run.  
 Participants were asked to rate for each trial how they felt on the 5-point 
scale and they rated their emotions in turn. The child who was waiting to rate was 
engaged in looking to the other side of the room.  
The experimenter underlined for each trial that a particular outcome was 
following the participant’s choice and that «the alternative choice could have been 
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his/her outcome but he/she didn’t choose that box, while his/her schoolfellow 
chose it».  
 
Results and discussion 
 
As in Experiment 1 participants received a score ranging from -2 to +2 depending 
on their emotional rating. The answer named “very sad” was coded as “-2”, the 
answer named “sad” as “-1”, the “not happy or sad” as “0”, the “happy” answer as 
“1” and the “very happy” as “2”.  
We performed a 4 (Age Group: 3-5; 6-7; 8-9; 10) x 4 (Trial Type: Regret, 
Relief, Envy, Gloating) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis of variance 
showed a main effect for Trial Type, F(3, 227) = 459.61, p < .001, partial 
2 
= .669   
and a significant interaction  for Trial Type and Age Group, F(9, 227) = 17.92, p < 
.001, partial 2 = .191. Mean scores are shown in fig. 6.4. 
 
Fig. 6.4 Mean scores for age groups 
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Both for regret and relief trials (private trials) post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests 
showed a significant difference between the age group of 3-5 with the age group 
of 6-7 year-old (p < .001), between the age group of 3-5 and the age group of 8-9 
year-old (p < .001), between the age group of 3-5 and the age group of 10-11 
(Regret, p < .001; Relief,  p < .05). We didn’t find any significant difference 
comparing the age group of 6-7 with the age group of 8-9 and 10-11, and the age 
group of 8-9 with the age group of 10-11. This is consistent with the idea that 
regret and relief are counterfactual emotions simultaneously experienced by 
children starting from the age of 6-7. 
For Social Trials (Envy and Gloating) post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests showed 
the following significant differences. For Envy trials we found a significant 
difference between the group of 3-5 and 6-7 year-old (p < .01). We didn’t find 
other significant differences between the other age groups. For gloating trials we 
didn’t find any significant difference comparing groups.      
In order to compare differences for each single age instead of groups, we 
ran a second Analysis of Variance comparing all ages.  
 We performed a 9 (Age) x 4 (Trial Type) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
We obtained a main effect of Trial Type, F(3, 222) = 395.21, p < .001, partial 
2 
= . 
640 and an interaction between Trial Type and Age, F(24, 222) = 8.41, p < .001, 
partial 2 = .232. Mean scores are shown in fig. 6.5. 
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Fig. 6.5  Mean scores for all ages 
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counterfactual outcome on the evaluation of the obtained outcome as the 
difference between relief and regret, we didn’t find any significant difference for 
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differences starting from the age of 5 (p < .001) (see fig. 6.6).  
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    Fig. 6.6  Means of Regret and Relief. All differences are significant (p < .001) starting at 5  
 
For Social Trials (Envy and Gloating), considering  the effect of the 
counterfactual outcome on the evaluation of the obtained outcome as the 
difference between Envy and Gloating, we found significant differences starting 
from the age of 4 (p < .001) (see fig. 6.7). 
 
 
  Fig. 6.7   Means of Envy and Gloating.  All differences are significant (p < .001) starting at 4 
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The first evidence for envy was at 4, t(24) = - 4.89, p < .001. At the same 
age we found the first evidence for gloating, t(23) = - 2.71, p < .001. The first 
evidence for regret was at 7, t(26) = - 3.08, p < .001. The first evidence for relief 
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We found the first significant difference between regret and envy at the 
age of 4, t(24)= - 4.89, p < .001. At the same age we found the only significant 
difference between relief and gloating, t(24) = 10.14, p < .001 (see fig. 6.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Fig. 6.8 Mean scores in Gloating and Relief trials for all ages 
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report gloating. But the differences between the two positive counterfactual 
emotions were found for the age of 4 only. They evaluated the same starting from 
the age of 5, without a distinction between a private and a social condition. This 
didn’t happen for negative counterfactual emotions, continuing to be 
differentiated during development. 
 Another evidence is children’s reports of the emotion of envy when they 
still are not able to report regret. This may be due both to an early development of 
social counterfactual emotions before private counterfactual emotions and to the 
fact that in social counterfactual emotions they have not to imagine the alternative 
scenario. They have it in front of them and they register that another child makes 
the right choice and they don’t.   
Because of the presence of the alternative scenario in front of them also in 
our private trials, we do have to hypothesize that social components and social 
comparisons play a fundamental role. 
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7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
It has been my aim in this work to investigate children’s early experience of 
counterfactual emotions. The thesis is divided into four parts, focusing on 
children’s early experience of regret and relief (Experiment 1 and 2), the role of 
responsibility in children’s reports of counterfactual emotions (Experiment 3), 
children’s ability to attribute counterfactual emotions to others (Experiment 4), 
and the age in which children become able to report social counterfactual 
emotions, i.e. counterfactual emotions after social comparisons (Experiment 5). 
My studies aimed to contribute to clarify some open questions found in the 
literature on counterfactual emotions, such as the absence of a distinction between 
the emotions of disappointment and regret, as well as between the emotions of 
elation and relief, the methodological differences between the previous studies, 
and finally the lack of studies on social counterfactual emotions.   
  
7.2 Links to the previous literature 
 
Counterfactual thinking is a necessary condition for the experience of 
counterfactual emotions, although it is not a sufficient condition. Now, research in 
developmental psychology provided evidence for children’s ability in 
counterfactual thinking at the age of 3 (e.g. Harris et al. 1996; German & Nichols, 
2003). But Beck et al. (2010) didn’t replicate these results and claimed that 
previous studies reported false positives. In order to think counterfactually is 
indeed necessary the development of language skills and also a sufficiently 
developed inhibitory control system (Robinson & Beck, 2000). 
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Counterfactual reasoning implies to focus not exclusively on reality (e.g 
obtained outcome), but to consider both reality and its alternatives (e.g. outcome 
we could have obtained with a different choice). Beck et al. (2009) argue that 
until children are able to represent the imagine of “a double chance” according 
what happened and what would have happened, they cannot think 
counterfactually, and hence cannot feel regret. The researchers reported that it is 
only from the age of six that children become able to imagine counterfactual 
thinking as a “double chance”. This is in agreement with Rafetseder et al. (2010), 
who maintained that children under five/six years of age do not think in a 
counterfactual mode but rather exploit other strategies such as conditional or 
logical reasoning. 
In our Experiment 2 children reported regret after the age of 6. We agree 
with the claim that the experience of counterfactual emotions rests on inhibitory 
control and the ability to represent a double scenario. The necessity of more 
demanding cognitive abilities and a more advanced inhibitory control is also 
congruent with our hypothesis of a more mature form of the two counterfactual 
emotions emerging from the age of 9-10 -- as our data show on the base of a more 
restrictive definition of regret and relief. 
Amsel and Smalley (2000) were the first authors who investigated regret 
in children. They involved participants in a game with boxes, testing 
counterfactual emotions and counterfactual thinking in 3- to 5-year-old children. 
They found an ability to think counterfactually at the age of 3 but evidence for 
regret not before the age of 5.  
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In a successive study Amsel and Smalley (2003) used a game involving 
cards instead of boxes to study both negative (termed ‘regret’) and positive (called 
‘elation’) counterfactual emotions. Their focus was on the participants’ 
judgements of the counterfactual-based emotion of regret in others and in 
themselves. Their results suggest that the recognition of the two counterfactual 
emotions is not possible before 5-6 years of age. In addition, their data show a 
simultaneous emergence of the ability to attribute counterfactual emotions to self 
and others. This simultaneous emergence of the two emotions starting from the 
age of 6-7 is also confirmed by our results in Experiment 4.    
Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) ran experiments in which children were asked 
to make decisions with respect to the emotional responses of other agents, 
presenting stories where the characters achieve an outcome as a result of a 
decision made. It resulted that children didn’t experience regret until the age of 7; 
and no evidence of relief was found.  
Ferrell et al. (2009) investigated the role of salience in counterfactual 
alternatives in order to understand regret and relief. They made two hypotheses: 
that it is simpler to reason counterfactually after a negative outcome instead of a 
positive outcome; and that if children were provided with a prompt they could 
reason counterfactually and experience counterfactual emotions before the age of 
7. They created “low salience” and “high salience” stories in which there were 
two protagonists who achieved the same outcome after making the same 
decisions, with only one of the two protagonists having had the opportunity to 
obtain a different outcome with an alternative decision. The researchers didn’t 
observe any evidence of regret before the age of 7.  
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Weisberg and Beck (2010) investigated the development of regret and 
relief in 5- to 8- year old children using a similar methodology as Amsel and 
Smalley (2000). They found that children are not able to experience regret until 
the age of 5 and relief until 7 and to attribute these emotions to others until 7.  In 
Experiment 1 we employed Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) methodology replicating 
their results. 
Weisberg and Beck (2011) used two boxes again and arrows. Children 
were also provided with feedbacks based on the correct or incorrect responses in 
the training procedure. In this second experiment both regret and relief are 
emotions that children are able to experience starting at 5-6 years of age. 
Following Weisberg and Beck (2011), O’Connor et al. (2012) tested 
children with boxes and arrows but introducing a baseline. They found evidence 
for regret starting from the age of 6-7 years.  
In Rafetsder and Perner’s (2012) experiments, the participants were 
presented two boxes. The researchers tested children’s ratings both presenting the 
question about the emotional evaluation twice (before and after seeing the 
alternative outcome) and asking the question only once, after showing the 
unchosen outcome. It resulted that children experience regret starting from the age 
of 9 years. 
 
7.3 Methodological issues  
 
Most of previous studies that investigate the development of regret and 
relief employed a first and a second emotional evaluation on a scale (Amsel et al. 
2000, 2003; Beck et al. 2010). In Amsel et al.’s first studies (2000) the 
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participants were involved in a game in which they had to rate the happiness of an 
agent, and in their last experiments they played for themselves in a card game 
against the experimenter. The participants were asked to rate the happiness of the 
agents (or their happiness when played for themselves). Their scale was a 4-point 
scale with 4 smileys representing the following emotions: “not at all happy”, “a 
little happy”, “pretty happy” or “very happy”. After the presentation of the scale, 
followed by the choice of the box and the revealing of the outcome, they were 
asked the first question: “How happy is (name of the doll) with the gift 
received?”. So the alternative outcome was revealed and they were asked to report 
how happy is the doll again. Authors examined the differences in the answers to 
the initial question and the counterfactual question in order to test whether the 
participants gave different judgments before and after discovering the contents of 
the unchosen box.  
In another experiment Amsel et al. (2003) introduced a new question. 
After revealing the selected card, questions became three. The initial one: “How 
do you feel / how does Billie feel after turning the card?”. The counterfactual 
question after shooting the non-selected card: “Who would win the sticker if you / 
Billie chose this card and not the one you / Billie selected? Billie, you or 
nobody?”. And the final question, asked after covering the non-selected card: “Do 
you remember you said that you was / Billie were / happy / sad after shooting the 
card? Now you/Billie saw the non-selected card. How do you feel about your / his 
choice? Do you feel / Does Billie feel happier /sadder than before, less happy /sad 
or the same? According to their results, the recognition of the two counterfactual 
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emotions is not possible before 5-6 years old. Data also show a simultaneous 
emergence of the ability to attribute counterfactual emotions to self and others. 
Also Weisberg and Beck (2010) investigated regret and relief with a first 
and a second emotional evaluation in a task in which children had to choice 
between two boxes. Children were asked to rate their emotions (first evaluation) 
after the opening of the chosen box and to rate their emotions again (second 
evaluation) after the opening of the unchosen box. Authors subtracted the initial 
score (baseline) from the final score, in order to have a score difference between -
4 and +4. The scores below zero indicated that participants were less happy for 
the choice of the box after seeing the contents of the alternative box (the one not 
chosen). This indicated regret. Scores above zero indicated instead relief. They 
reported that regret emerges at five years old while relief at seven. 
Weisberg and Beck (2011) employed the two emotional evaluations again 
but also three arrows pointing up, left or right in order to rate for the second 
emotional evaluation scores like “even sadder” (pointing left), “even happier” 
(pointing right), “the same” (pointing up). Children were also provided with 
feedbacks based on the correct or incorrect responses in the training procedure. In 
this second experiment both regret and relief are emotions that children are able to 
experience starting at 5-6 years old. 
O’Connor et al. (2012) introduced two methodological changes to 
Weisberg and Beck’s (2010) experiment. They introduced a baseline in order to 
measure the understanding of regret avoiding a first and a second evaluation after 
the choice and they used the three arrows employed by Weisberg and Beck’s 
(2011) experiment. The baseline aimed to rate their emotions after the choice 
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comparing it with a same outcome as a counterfactual prize. They found 
evidences for regret in the age group of 6-7 years old and 8-9. Both these age 
groups were also able to explain their change in feelings because of the greater 
desirability of the counterfactual outcome. They obtained an increase of the 
reported counterfactual children for trials in which participants received the 
baseline first.  
 In a second experiment they still used the baseline, because of the results 
of the experiment one and they introduced three arrows as Weisberg and Beck 
(2011) did, in order to ask children to evaluate their emotions as even sadder, even 
happier of the same. All children received the baseline trial first. Children were 
able to feel regret starting at 6 years old.  
Finally, in Rafetsder and Perner’s (2012) experiments participants were 
presented with a 8-point smiley faces from very happy to very sad. They were 
shown two boxes in order to choose one. They tested children’s ratings both 
presenting the question twice (before and after seeing the alternative outcome) and 
presenting  the question only one time, after showing the unchosen outcome. 
Their results are that children experience regret starting at 9. 
In our experiments we decided to imply the same scale as in Weisberg and 
Beck’s (2010) study and also to ask how participants feel instead of how much 
they are happy, as in Amsel and Smalley’s (2000; 2003) study. But, as I 
described, we introduced only a final emotion evaluation in games in which 
children are provided with choices in which they can see the content of two 
transparent boxes (and consequently the obtained and unobtained outcome) all the 
time.  
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7.4 Conclusions  
 
I have proposed a new methodology in order to test the development of 
regret and relief, also with a distinction between the emotions of disappointment 
and elation (partial feedback condition) and the emotions of regret and relief 
(complete feedback condition). After a replication of Weisberg’s and Beck’s 
(2010) results (Experiment 1), employing their same methodology, with a lag 
between regret (5 years old) and relief (7 years old), I ran Experiment 2 with the 
new methodology.  
Results show that in the range of 3-5 years old children demonstrate to not 
understand disappointment and regret. They do understand the game and the 
scale, as we tested with training trials and the emotional evaluation training, but 
they are not able to compare what happened with what would have happened, 
both when they are responsible for the outcome (regret) and when they are not 
(disappointment). Children aged 3 to 5 always scored positive emotions both in 
elation and relief trials and in disappointment and regret trials, probably because 
they enjoyed the game, as they themselves referred when asked about their 
positive evaluation even if they didn’t obtain anything (or they obtained 3 or 1) 
but they would have obtained, for example, 8. 
First evidences for disappointment and regret reports were not until the age 
of 6. But the difference between the two emotions is not significant.  
If we examine the effect of the counterfactual outcome on the evaluation 
of the obtained outcome as the difference between elation and disappointment and 
relief and regret, we could conclude that regret and relief are both experienced 
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starting at 7. This is first time that the difference between the counterfactual 
emotions of regret and relief is significant. But this doesn’t consider a distinction 
between our partial condition (elation and disappointment) and complete 
condition (regret and relief).  
Considering a more restrictive definition, defined as the differential 
evaluation between upward (downward) counterfactual in the partial vs. complete 
condition -- and hence disappointment (elation) vs. regret (relief) --, we found a 
lag between the two emotions, with relief experienced first time at 6 and regret 
experienced first time at 9, as in Rafetseder & Perner (2012). 
The idea of a lag, with the emergence of regret after relief is also 
supported by lower scores in reporting regret than relief. The emotion of regret 
implies an assumption of responsibility for one’s own actions and the consequent 
necessity to learn from the past and behave in a different way in the future. All 
this implies more commitment, as well as more sophisticated cognitive abilities 
than those involved in being relieved for the positive results of one’s own actions 
in response to a potential loss.  
So, in order to investigate the role of the responsibility for the outcome, 
with a manipulation of participants’ sense and judgment of agency, we ran 
Experiment 3. In this experiment children rated the counterfactual emotion of 
regret starting from the age of 6. And no significant differences were found for the 
age group of 3-5. We didn’t find any significant differences for any of the Age 
Groups comparing the conditions of Agency Disappointment and No Agency 
Disappointment, supporting the idea of a difference between the emotions of 
Disappointment and Regret. No significant differences between groups were 
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found also for Elation trials comparing the Agency with the No Agency conditions. 
A significant difference was found only for the age group of 10 comparing the 
Agency and the No Agency conditions for Relief trials. This support the idea that 
positive counterfactual emotions are something children experience starting at 6-7 
but that the role of responsibility and -- maybe other cognitive factors -- 
contribute to an amplification of them not before the age of 10.      
Differences between Agency Regret and No Agency Regret were found 
starting from the age group of 6-7, supporting the idea of an ability to understand 
and report regret at this age. In Agency Condition we replicated results of 
Experiment 2, finding significant differences between disappointment and elation 
trials and regret and relief trials for the age group of 6-7 year-old, a significant 
difference between elation and relief started at 6 and a significant difference 
between disappointment and regret starting at 9. 
Experiment 4 aimed to test differences between self- and other- attributing 
of counterfactual emotions. We found significant results in Regret trials between 
Self and Other conditions starting from the age group of 6-7. Children were more 
able to report negative counterfactual emotions for others then for themselves. 
We didn’t find any significant differences for any of the Age Groups 
comparing the conditions of Self Disappointment and Other Disappointment, Self  
and Other Elation and also Self Relief and Other Relief.     
In the disappointment and regret trials results showed lower scores for 
Other condition than Self condition. In the elation and relief trials they performed 
the same. We hypothesize that children found more simple to attribute negative 
counterfactual emotions to the experimenter rather than attributing to themselves, 
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because of the difficulty in the introspection of these complex emotions. We 
didn’t find this effect for positive counterfactual emotions: children performed the 
same in both conditions, supporting again the idea of a difference between the two 
emotions with a more complexity for regret. 
Finally, Experiment 5 tested the effect of social comparison in reporting 
counterfactual emotions. We found children’s first report of the emotion of envy 
at the age of 3, when they still are not able to report the emotion of regret. But 
significant differences between the two were found starting from the age of 4. We 
also found children’s first report of the emotion of gloating at the age of 3, when 
they also started to report relief. But the differences between the two positive 
counterfactual emotions were found for the age of 4 only. They evaluated the 
same starting from the age of 5, without a distinction between a private and a 
social condition. This didn’t happen for negative counterfactual emotions, 
continuing to be differentiated during development. 
The evidence for envy before regret may be due both to an early 
development of social counterfactual emotions before private counterfactual 
emotions and to the fact that for social counterfactual emotions children don’t 
need to imagine the alternative scenario. They have the result of the choice made 
by another child in front of them, and they have only to register that the latter 
made the right choice and they didn’t.   
But because of the presence of the alternative scenario in front of them 
also in our private trials, we do have to hypothesize that social components and 
social comparisons play a fundamental role. 
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 In conclusion, we showed for the first time evidences for envy and 
gloating at the age of 4, and for regret and relief at the age of 6-7. Our findings 
support the idea of a development of a late and more mature ability for those two 
counterfactual emotions after the age of 9-10.  
There are many limits for our studies and maybe one of them, as well as in 
previous studies, could be the lack of testing with implicit measures together with 
the emotional evaluation scale.  
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